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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1783.1/302
Title: Invariance failure under subgame perfectness in sequential bargaining
Authors: Zwick, Rami
Rapoport, Amnon
Weg, Eythan
Keywords: Decision making
Bargaining
Game theory
Invariance
Issue Date: Oct-2000
Citation: Journal of economic psychology, v. 21, no. 5, Oct 2000, p. 517-544
Abstract: A basic property of any normative theory of decision making - individual or group - is its invariance under the theory's own equivalence specification. Growing evidence from experimental studies in several areas of game playing indicates that the game-theoretic notion of strategic equivalence is systematically violated in the behavioral arena. The present study expands the design of previous studies of bilateral bargaining by including a third party and a new trading rule - modifications which induce behavioral patterns that reject equivalence under subgame perfection.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1783.1/302
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