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http://hdl.handle.net/1783.1/302
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| Title: | Invariance failure under subgame perfectness in sequential bargaining |
| Authors: | Zwick, Rami
Rapoport, Amnon
Weg, Eythan |
| Keywords: | Decision making
Bargaining
Game theory
Invariance |
| Issue Date: | Oct-2000 |
| Citation: | Journal of economic psychology, v. 21, no. 5, Oct 2000, p. 517-544 |
| Abstract: | A basic property of any normative theory of decision making - individual or group - is its invariance under the theory's own equivalence specification. Growing evidence from experimental studies in several areas of game playing indicates that the game-theoretic notion of strategic equivalence is systematically violated in the behavioral arena. The present study expands the design of previous studies of bilateral bargaining by including a third party and a new trading rule - modifications which induce behavioral patterns that reject equivalence under subgame perfection. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/1783.1/302 |
| Appears in Collections: | MARK Journal/Magazine Articles
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