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Provision of binary public goods in single-period social dilemmas : theories and experiments

Authors Rapoport, Amnon
Issue Date 1999-02-19
Source Marketing Working Paper Series ; MKTG 99.133
Summary The present review summarizes the major results of a systematic program of theoretical and experimental research on the voluntary contributions mechanism in a public goods environment characterized by binary public goods, binary contributions, and no iteration of the social dilemma. Driven by an expected value analysis of the agent's belief structure, the program focuses on three types of environment: simultaneous contributions made by members of a single group, sequential contributions made by members of the same group, and simultaneous contributions in an intergroup competition for the provision of public goods. The major variables studied in this research program include disincentives to contribute, heterogeneity vs. homogeneity of the group members, binary vs. incremental contribution, preplay communication, and the protocol of play. We find strong support for the expected value model when contributions are made simultaneously in either the single-group or two-group case, and for the subgame perfect equilibrium solution concept when they are made sequentially.
Language English
Format Working paper
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