Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1783.1/1199

Modeling competition and equilibrium of multiple private toll roads in a traffic network

Authors Woo, Ka-Kin
Yang, Hai
Issue Date 1999
Source Transportation science and technology into the next millenium : proceedings of the Fourth Conference of the Hong Kong Society for Transportation Studies, Hong Kong, HKUST, Hong Kong , 4 December 1999, p. 169-178
Summary This paper examines the equilibrium based on a situation where are two or more profit maximizing private firms that operate multiple toll roads in a road network. Their profits are interrelated due to demand inter-dependence in the network. A competitive game model is developed to analyze the strategic interactions between the private toll road operators in determining their supply (road capacity) and price (toll level) over the network. A simple but representative case of two competitive firms, each providing a single toll road (corresponding to a single link) on the network, is considered where the two toll roads are either substitutable or complementary in terms of their demand interdependence. A quasi-Newton method in conjunction with sensitivity analysis method of equilibrium network flow is used to determine the competitive game solutions subject to network equilibrium constrains.
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Rights Reproduced by permission. Modeling competition and equilibrium of multiple private toll roads in a traffic network. Woo; Ka-kin; Yang, Hai. Transportation Science and Technology into the Next Millenium, 1999. Proceedings. Fourth Conference of the Hong Kong Society for Transportation Studies, 4 December 1999, Page(s): 169-178. Copyright 1999, Hong Kong Society for Transportation Studies, Hong Kong.
Language English
Format Conference paper
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