Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1783.1/302

Invariance Failure under Subgame Perfectness in Sequential Bargaining

Authors Zwick, R
Rapoport, A
Weg, E
Issue Date 2000
Source Journal of Economic Psychology, v. 21, (5), 2000, OCT, p. 517-544
Summary basic property of any normative theory of decision making - individual or group - is its invariance under the theory's own equivalence specification. Growing evidence from experimental studies in several areas of game playing indicates that the game-theoretic notion of strategic equivalence is systematically violated in the behavioral arena. The present study expands the design of previous studies of bilateral bargaining by including a third party and a new trading rule - modifications which induce behavioral patterns that reject equivalence under subgame perfection. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. PsycINFO classification: 2900; 2300 JEL classification: C72; C78; C91.
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ISSN 0167-4870
Language English
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