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Invariance Failure under Subgame Perfectness in Sequential Bargaining

Authors Zwick, R. HKUST affiliated (currently or previously)
Rapoport, A. HKUST affiliated (currently or previously)
Weg, E.
Issue Date 2000
Source Journal of Economic Psychology , v. 21, (5), 2000, OCT, p. 517-544
Summary basic property of any normative theory of decision making - individual or group - is its invariance under the theory's own equivalence specification. Growing evidence from experimental studies in several areas of game playing indicates that the game-theoretic notion of strategic equivalence is systematically violated in the behavioral arena. The present study expands the design of previous studies of bilateral bargaining by including a third party and a new trading rule - modifications which induce behavioral patterns that reject equivalence under subgame perfection. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. PsycINFO classification: 2900; 2300 JEL classification: C72; C78; C91.
ISSN 0167-4870
Language English
Format Article
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