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Product Recall and Liability

Authors Hua, Xinyu View this author's profile
Issue Date 2011
Source Journal of law, economics, & organization , v. 27, (1), 2011, p. 113-136
Summary This article examines a firm's incentives to recall its product after learning that the product may harm consumers. It discusses whether courts should protect consumers who do not comply with recalls. Under the "no duty to return" rule, the firm bears the same liability no matter whether it has made a recall or not. The firm then may not recall the product as often as socially desired or provide insufficient reimbursement for consumers' return costs. In contrast, the "full duty to return" rule denies the firm's future liabilities after it makes a recall. More consumers then return the product, which may reduce the firm's incentives to recall the product. We show that the "full duty to return" rule may or may not generate more product recalls or higher social welfare. We also discuss the "partial duty to return" rule, which partially reduces the firm's liability after it makes a recall.
ISSN 8756-6222
Language English
Format Article
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