||This dissertation is concerned with a study of nonprice rationing. Restraints on prices in the public sector is commonplace. It is frequently asserted that shortage is developed when limited quantities of an economic good are provided by the government at a money price below its market clearing level. As such, the criterion of willingness to pay alone is not sufficient to determine resource allocation--when individuals value a good more than the price being asked for, some nonprice ways must emerge to eliminate the excess demand. The use of nonprice criteria to allocate resources is extremely diverse. The criterion of willingness to wait and the criterion of chance are two prevailing examples. One major purpose of this work to interpret their variation. An almost inevitable consequence of the use of nonprice criteria to allocate resources is the emergence of post-allocation trading. In practice, it is frequently observed that such post-allocation trading is, at least to some extent, restricted by the government. An analysis on the effects of post-allocation will also be offered.