Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1783.1/56481

The right of first offer

Authors Hua, Xinyu View this author's profile
Issue Date 2012
Source International journal of industrial organization , v. 30, (4), 2012, p. 389-397
Summary This paper examines the right of first offer, which requires a seller to bargain with the contracted buyer before subsequent buyers arrive. The contract also prevents the seller from selling his unique asset to subsequent buyers at a price below what he offers to the contracted buyer. The right of first offer makes the seller less aggressive in bargaining with the contracted buyer, who is privately informed about his valuation. Such a contract can reduce inter-temporal misallocation, in which a subsequent buyer gets the asset when the contracted buyer has higher valuation. But it also may cause misallocation in which the contracted buyer gets the asset when subsequent buyers have higher valuations. Overall, whether the right of first offer can increase the joint surplus for the seller and the contracted buyer, as well as social welfare, depends on the contracted buyer's renegotiation power and the distribution of the buyers' valuations. This paper also discusses the differences between the right of first offer and the most-favored-customer clause. © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Subjects
ISSN 0167-7187
Language English
Format Article
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