||In a supply chain serving a market with random demand, a downstream retailer faces uncertainty in the availability of demand information. Whether the retailer will be informed of the market demand, i.e, whether his information acquisition will be successful, can be uncertain. I study two issues in supply chain management when a retailer's information acquisition has uncertain outcome: the strategic disclosure of acquired information, and the transparency of information acquisition process. Game theoretic approach is employed to study how a retailer's disclosure strategy and performance are impacted by his information capability and the competition between supply chains, and whether making the information acquisition outcome transparent to the upstream manufacturer benefits the retailer. For strategic disclosure, I find that a retailer discloses more information when his information capability is greater and less information when the supply chain competition is more intense. For information acquisition transparency, I find that when facing a very powerful manufacturer, such as one who can dominate the terms of trade by offering a quantity bundle contract menu, the retailer may become less disadvantageous, and gain more from his information, by making his information acquisition process transparent to the manufacturer. A retailer may not always want to improve his information capability even when it is at no cost to him.