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Cybercrime Deterrence and International Legislation: Evidence from Distributed Denial of Service Attacks

Authors Hui, Kai Lung View this author's profile
Kim, Seung Hyun
Wang, Qiu-Hong
Issue Date 2017
Source MIS Quarterly: Management Information Systems , v. 41, (2), June 2017, p. 497-523
Summary In this paper, we estimate the impact of enforcing the Convention on Cybercrime (COC) on deterring distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks. Our data set comprises a sample of real, random spoof-source DDOS attacks recorded in 106 countries in 177 days in the period 2004-2008. We find that enforcing the COC decreases DDOS attacks by at least 11.8 percent, but a similar deterrence effect does not exist if the enforcing countries make a reservation on international cooperation. We also find evidence of network and displacement effects in COC enforcement. Our findings imply attackers in cyberspace are rational, motivated by economic incentives, and strategic in choosing attack targets. We draw related implications.
ISSN 0276-7783
Language English
Format Article
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