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Social dilemmas embedded in between-group competitions : effects of contest and distribution rules

Authors Rapoport, Amnon
Amaldoss, Wilfred
Issue Date 1997-09
Summary We consider two classes of collective action problems that occur simultaneously at several levels of hierarchical organizations. Our objective is to model how individual incentives to cooperate in the two most commonly studied types of within-group social dilemmas are enhanced when these dilemmas are embedded in between-group competitions for divisible private goods. We classify these problems in terms of three dimensions, namely, the payoff structure of the within-group conflict, the contest rule used to determine the outcome of the between-group competition, and the profit sharing rule for dividing the private good, or prize, among members of the winning group. Nash equilibrium solutions are constructed for these two classes of collective action problems, and experimentally testable predictions concerning group size, contest rules, and the comparison of proportional vs. egalitarian profit-sharing rules on individual contributions are derived and exemplified.
Language English
Format Working paper
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