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The choice for or against opportunistic behavior in interfirm relationships : an integration of managerial and game-theoretic perspectives

Authors Burgers, Willem P.
Hwang, Peter
Issue Date 1996-02
Summary The problem of opportunistic behavior in interdependent, cooperative relationships receives attention both in the management literature and in game theory. This paper combines contributions from both literatures in a single decision-analytic, game theoretic model of opportunistic behavior in interfirm alliances. The model shows that even infinite time horizons and full trust, although important, may not be sufficient to make mutually beneficial cooperation a rational choice. Managers seeking to improve cooperation are advised to minimize, both for themselves and for their partners, both the benefits of opportunistic behavior and the costs of undue victimization.
Language English
Format Working paper
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