Affirmative Action, Ethnic Minorities and China's Universities

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Introduction to China’s Preferential Policies

China has one of the oldest and largest sets of state-sponsored preferential policies (youhui zhengce) for ethnic minorities. Only India’s system of "reservations" for its "scheduled tribes" is older and as extensive, but it is not as critical politically. Preferences accorded Indian ethnic minorities must be shared with "scheduled castes," who outnumber "scheduled tribes" two-to-one. In some Indian states reservations are also given the even more numerous "other backward classes," so that in a few states the preferred population approaches half the total inhabitants.¹

Minorities encompassed nine percent of China’s population in 1995 or 110 million people. That is 20 million more than five years earlier and 40 million less than are expected in 2010, by which time China’s minorities will equal the total population of Russia.² Minority areas take in two-thirds of the PRC and have the bulk of its natural resources.³ They are thus crucial to the PRC’s existence as a state. Its leaders in turn see affirmative action as vital to the cohesion of the minority areas.

While the PRC preferential policies program dates from the inception of the state⁴ and is a variant of a concept pioneered in the former Soviet Union,⁵ affirmative action has been an explicit PRC policy only from the mid-1980s.⁶ Chinese officials have missed few opportunities since then to tout the program. They assert, for example, that preferential policies are one reason why the
system of ethnic relations in China is superior to that of the United States.\textsuperscript{7}

China's preferential policies are applied to minority areas\textsuperscript{8} and minorities individuals. Lower-level minority areas receive infrastructural subsidies from higher jurisdictions. Budgetary subventions, disproportionate investment in public works and the provision and training of personnel are common features.\textsuperscript{9} In exchange, minority areas are expected to make "extensive efforts to support the country's construction by providing more natural resources."\textsuperscript{10} The PRC government is quick, however, to defend against charges of "internal colonialism" by showing that most natural resources are used locally and that it pumps at least as much money into minority areas as flows out to central government coffers: the center claims to invest about 30 billion a year in minority areas, a sum equal to its revenues from all minority area sources.\textsuperscript{11} Moreover, unlike in colonial relationships, minority citizens have more entitlements inscribed in law than do citizens of the majority Han Chinese "inner areas" (neidi).

In China there is an incomplete, but substantial coincidence between minority status and impoverishment.\textsuperscript{12} The PRC's leaders are convinced that ethnic relations will be stabilized only when minority area living standards are greatly improved and that prosperity will come to these areas more rapidly by enhancing their comparative advantage in the "socialist market economy."\textsuperscript{13} Liberal investment laws, exemptions from tariffs for certain imported goods,
subsidized high salaries for skilled personnel in state-owned enterprises and other inducements to development are thus preferentially accorded minority areas. The preferences given minority autonomous regions (zizhi diqu) are important enough to development that leaders of the northwestern province of Qinghai, whose territory is 97 percent sub-provincial Tibetan autonomous prefectures, want the whole province to be converted into one autonomous region or be given the preferences accorded the neighboring Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). Because the Uygur minority region of Xinjiang has autonomous powers, its economic prospects are seen as better than the mainly Han-inhabited provinces of China’s northwest, such as Shanxi and Gansu.14

Major aspects of the lives of minority individuals are also impacted by preferential policies. There are preferences for family planning (exemption from the minimum marriage age and one-child strictures); education (preferential admissions, lowered school fees, boarding schools, remedial programs); employment (extra consideration in hiring and promotion of cadres); business development (special loans and grants, exemptions from certain taxes); and political representation (proportionate or greater numbers of minorities in "people’s congresses" and among minority area leaders).15 In China’s southwestern Yunnan province, where minorities are 34 percent of the population, there are about 150 different preferential policies.16

Preferential policies are seen as the main tool in narrowing the economic and
social gaps between Han and minority people. PRC officials argue that if equal treatment were the principle in determining entry into universities, for example, equality of opportunity would sharply diminish. Unequal treatment is seen by them as fostering equal opportunity, with "equality-in-fact" (shishishangde pingdeng) the long-term goal. Because many minority peoples live in remote areas, where development lags increasingly behind the growth of coastal regions, the gap between minorities and Han living standards has widened, however, so that economic and educational equality remains illusive.

Most minorities live in western China. In 1981, the economic growth rate of the west was 90 percent that of the east and per capita production was 68 percent. In 1992, the figures were 50 percent for both. In Hainan province, in China's far south, minorities are 17 percent of the population. A 1995 official study revealed that, whereas in 1987 Hainan's minority autonomous areas produced 25.9 percent of provincial gross domestic product, in 1992 these areas produced 21.5 percent, in 1993, 20.1 percent and in 1994 to 17.7 percent. In Yunnan in 1996, the richest Han area of the province had an income level twenty times that of the poorest minority area. The income level of Han peasants near the capital, Kunming, was 4-5 times the income level of minority peasants in impoverished Guangnan county. Minority area officials acknowledge the growing Han/minority economic gap and some accuse the
government of aggravating it through anti-redistributive tax reforms carried out in China from 1994.²³

Preferential policies do nevertheless benefit broad sections of the minority population, particularly in family planning and education. Preferences in higher education are especially important because they are aimed at creating a reliable minority middle class. Stronger minority administrative, professional and technical strata are seen by PRC leaders as essential to increasing the legitimacy of the state among the key sectors that will mediate between it and the larger minority society during what promises to be a long period of overall widening of economic and social differences among China’s ethnic groups and regions.

The Scope of Preferences in Higher Education

Preferential policies in family planning provide a valued benefit for which almost all minority people become eligible at some point in their lives. Affirmative action in higher education encompasses a much smaller number of minority people. It is, however, a key facet of minority elite formation, as higher education has become a prerequisite for hiring and promotion to key cadre positions.²⁴ For example, in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region in the mid-1980s, only about seven percent of minority cadres had diplomas from institutions of higher learning. By the mid-1990s, however, some 30 percent of cadres had graduated from such institutions.²⁵

In contrast to most preferences, which are available only to minorities who live
in minority areas, preferential admissions is extended without regard to residence. It thus can be used by the one-quarter of the minority population that lives in the mainly Han areas. Preferential admissions, moreover, is the only policy provided to every minority ethnic, including those, such as the Koreans, Mongols and Tatars, who on average surpass the Han in their level of tertiary schooling.

For example, in prosperous Jiangsu province, the proportion of minorities, at 0.25 percent, is the smallest in the country, although Jiangsu minority people still number over 100,000 and are accorded preferential policies under the 1997 Jiangsu "Law to Protect Minority Rights." The bulk of Jiangsu minority people are Hui ("Muslim Chinese") and their educational level is higher than that of the Han. Moreover, the Hui, who have a background in commerce, are more prosperous than the Han.

Jiangsu Hui applicants nevertheless receive preferences in admission to tertiary education. Twenty points are added to their scores on the national entrance examination if they apply to one of the thirteen nationalities institutes (minzu xueyuan) dedicated to educating minorities. Five points are added if they apply to other institutions, such as the general universities in minority areas or national universities that have so-called "ethnic classes" or cohorts (minzu ban). In 1996, the national entrance examination had a total of 750 points, but because competition for university places in China is fierce, a single point
can make a difference in seeking admission to higher education in general or to a student's university of choice.\textsuperscript{32}

The preference received even by relatively well-off minorities accords with the national policy that mandates universities to "relax their admission standards to an appropriate extent"\textsuperscript{33} for minorities. This policy has a legal basis in section 65 of the 1984 Law on Ethnic Regional Autonomy (\textit{minzu quyu zizhi fa}):

The state shall set up institutes of nationalities and, in other institutions of higher education, nationality-oriented classes and preparatory classes that enroll only students from minority nationalities. Preferred enrollment and preferred assignment of jobs may also be introduced. In enrollment, institutions of higher education and secondary technical schools shall appropriately set lower standards and requirements for the admission of students from minority nationalities.\textsuperscript{34}

The PRC State Council's "Circular on Some Questions About Further Implementation of the Law on Ethnic Regional Autonomy" Point 8\textsuperscript{35} orders universities to give minorities "priority over others with equal qualifications" and to set up preparatory courses for them. Article 14 of the "Regulations on Ethnic Township Administration" of 1993\textsuperscript{36} states that quotas for preferential admission to tertiary institutions of students from ethnic townships may be used, if higher-level government bodies agree to set up ethnic cohorts at such institutions.\textsuperscript{37}

Ethnic cohorts were first authorized by a Ministry of Education regulation of 1980 and set up with 30 students each at five universities.\textsuperscript{38} The \textit{minzu ban} system expanded rapidly and members are usually drawn from the same ethn
or minority area and live and study together. The existence of particular ethnic cohorts depends on the influence of minority areas, since each negotiates with universities to run the cohorts. For example, before it was abolished in 1988, Hainan province's Li-Miao Autonomous Prefecture ensured that there were Hainan ban at some neidi universities, such as East China Normal University. 39 Many prominent universities now have ethnic cohorts. There were, for example, minzu ban at 16 Beijing universities in 1994-1995, six national and ten locally-controlled institutions. 40 At most schools, an ethnic cohort means an extra year of undergraduate study in a preparatory class (yuke ban) before taking on the regular curriculum, but some minzu ban students receive special tutoring and are expected to earn their degree in four years. 41

"Xinjiang classes" (Xinjiang ban) totalled 450 students at 14 neidi universities in 1987. 42 By 1991, 3,600 Xinjiang minority students were at inland universities and in 1993 there were 110 Xinjiang classes at 46 universities. By 1995, there were Xinjiang ban at 54 neidi schools and 1989-1995, 5,000 Xinjiang minority students had graduated from inland universities. Similar classes exist for some other ethnics. 43 For example, there were "Tibetan classes" (Xizang ban) at 28 inland universities in 1994.

Minzu ban are also found in upper middle schools, where their main task is to prepare students to go to universities. In Hainan, there have been upper middle school minzu ban since the early 1980s and every year 20-25 minority students...
from the cohorts of 45-55 students go on to university. Hainan universities also have *minzu ban*, with 40 students at each and one year of preparatory classes required of each cohort.\textsuperscript{44}

Since the early 1980s one-year preparatory courses have been held at key universities and nationality institutes by agreement between minority areas and the schools\textsuperscript{45} and by the end of the 1980s, 40,000 minority students had gone through such courses at over 140 tertiary institutions.\textsuperscript{46} These *yu ke ban* serve students who failed to enter a university through the national enrollment system and become part of what is officially termed a "nationwide pre-college education system for students from minority ethnic groups." More than 11,000 minority students were enrolled in *yu ke ban* at 138 institutions in 20-plus provinces in 1996.\textsuperscript{47}

In Ningxia, for example, such classes exist at Ningxia University, Guyuan Normal School and Guyuan Ethnic Minority Normal School.\textsuperscript{48} At Beijing University, there are *yuke ban* for Mongolian students, each enrolling 30 students, and at Jilin University, such classes exist for Tibetan students.\textsuperscript{49} Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture in Sichuan has Yi preparatory classes at its normal schools. Students take an advanced secondary school curriculum for one year and then sit for the national entrance examination. If their scores are high enough, they go to universities, if not, they remain at normal school. Liangshan University, which is a college-level technical school (*da zhuang*) with
an engineering emphasis, also has a preparatory class.⁵⁰

There are also long-term programs to cultivate young talent. One involves bringing promising minority pre-college students to study at nationality institutes for three to six years.⁵¹ The program for Tibetan students at middle schools outside Tibet, which by 1995 had enrolled some 13,000 students at 150 schools in 26 provinces, is also part of a long-term effort.⁵² Some universities even have primary school-to-college (yi tiao long, "one lane") programs for minority students.⁵³

**Affirmative Action and the Higher Educational Gap**

When the Chinese Communist Party achieved national power in 1949, minorities accounted for less than one percent of all university students. The proportion increased rapidly in the 1950s, peaking at 3.7 percent in 1956-1957 and declining somewhat thereafter as the national entrance examination introduced in 1954 began to affect student selection. Minority enrollment stood at 3.2 percent in 1964-1965, on the eve of China's tumultuous Cultural Revolution.

Universities were closed during the first few years of the turbulent decade that followed. When they reopened -- with a hyper-politicized curriculum and without any examinations -- preferences for minority admittees were redoubled. By the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, 6.5 percent of university students were minorities. The reinstitution of the national entrance examination in
1977\textsuperscript{54} caused the proportion of minority students to fall sharply, bottoming out at 3.7 percent in 1978-1979. In 1980, it was announced that minimum score requirements would be lowered for minority applicants to universities.\textsuperscript{55} The percentage of minority students climbed again, peaking in 1991-1992 at seven percent before declining to 6.4 percent in 1992-1994 and, perhaps 5.7 percent in 1994-1995 (see Appendix A).\textsuperscript{56} The recent decline is related to the rapid expansion of Chinese higher education in the 1990s. There were nearly three million students at mid-decade and as many as seven million are expected to be enrolled at PRC universities in the year 2000.\textsuperscript{57} The imposition of tuition may also discourage some minority students, who are generally from poorer backgrounds than Han students. Until 1989, higher education was free, but the state assigned students their initial post-graduation positions. With the beginning of the system of two-way selection (\textit{shuang xiang xuan ze}), in which the graduate chooses the work-unit and \textit{vice versa}, modest tuition was imposed. Substantial tuition charges began in 1994, with the "combining of the tracks" (\textit{bingsui}) of self-supporting and publicly-supported students. By late 1995, 247 institutions had tuition and in 1996-1997, the number rose to 661 of China's 1,096 institutions of higher learning.\textsuperscript{58} Tuition varies from school to school -- and within institutions according to whether a major is considered "hot" or "cold."\textsuperscript{59} In 1996, the cost of educating an undergraduate was about 5,000 yuan per annum. The state wants to
gradually make a portion of the student body cover the full cost. Another portion, however, cannot even pay tuition that covers one-third of the cost of their education. In 1996, 10-15 percent of students could not afford the existing school fees. Some relief is provided by the central government through the Prime Minister's Reserve Fund. Provinces also aid needy students and some set aside special funds to pay the tuition of impecunious minority students.\textsuperscript{60}

Minority students are disproportionately in danger of having financial difficulties. For example, among Tibetans studying at neidi universities, about half come from rural families and a few of these students have had to withdraw from study after the imposition of tuition. Some universities have lost interest in recruiting new students from minority and poor areas or have reduced the number of minority students because "work-study, loans and subsidies" (qigong zhuxue butie) or "subsidies for the especially poor" (tekun butie) would have to be paid to them. Overall, such outlays equalled 45 percent of the monies earned by universities through tuition in 1994.\textsuperscript{61}

The central government has announced a policy of discounts or exemptions from tuition to reduce financial obstacles to minority enrollment. This includes charging lower tuition and living expenses for some students from poor and minority areas, a policy embodied in the State Education Commission (SEC) "Notice on the Deduction of Tuition Fees for Ordinary Higher Education Students with Economic Difficulties"\textsuperscript{62} The center also announced, in the
spring of 1996, that students in normal, agricultural, forestry, nautical, physical culture and ethnic minority institutions were not to be charged tuition.\textsuperscript{63} For most majors at nationalities institutes, however, tuition was charged students in 1996-1997.

At the Central Nationalities University (\textit{Zhongyang minzu daxue}) in Beijing at least 90 percent of students must be minorities and about 95 percent of students are. Tuition in 1996-1997 stood at 1,400 yuan for Journalism majors, 1,200 yuan for such majors as Banking, Trade & Economics, Taxation & Law and 1,000 for Education Management, Foreign Trade Secretarial and History majors. Only Ethnic Language & Literature, Linguistics and Anthropology were tuition-exempt. Although the University provided student subsidies of 89.5 yuan per month, tuition is still judged by minority area officials to be too high to be affordable to many minority students.\textsuperscript{64} Similarly, at Southwest Nationalities University (\textit{Xinan minzu daxue}) in Chengdu, Sichuan, where 80 percent of students must be and are in fact minorities, tuition for 1996-1997 was 1,700 yuan for all majors, except Bilingual Han/Tibetan Administration, which was 500 yuan.\textsuperscript{65}

A disproportionate number of minority students now seek to become teachers. The lower entrance requirements of the normal universities and teacher training institutes are not the only reason. These schools also attract large numbers of minority students because, apart from ethnic cohorts and preparatory classes at
universities outside the autonomous areas, teachers' colleges (shifan daxue) are the remaining tuition-exempt avenue to higher education. Teaching for a minority student also often means a career in his or her home area, working in the indigenous language. There is great demand for such teachers due to the rapid expansion of minority primary and secondary education and because many fewer young Han graduates than before volunteer to work in the minority areas. In these areas, moreover, most higher education institutions are dedicated to teacher training. For example, in the Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture, four of the six tertiary institutions are devoted to teacher training and in the autonomous areas of Guizhou, three of the four tertiary institutions are teacher training institutions.66

At the general universities in minority areas, the imposition of tuition has pushed down the percentage of minority students. In Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Prefecture, Yunnan, officials maintain that the costs of attending university discourage minority students from even enrolling in upper secondary schools, which are viewed as useless without the prospect of going on to university.67 In Xinjiang in 1995, about one half of students in the tertiary system were self-supporting (zifei or zikaoban). Tuition in 1995 at local higher education institutions generally amounted to about 2,000 yuan per year. Xinjiang's Han students are mostly urban, while 77 percent of its minority tertiary students are from peasant families. The average per capita urban
Xinjiang income is almost four times the income of Xinjiang Uygur peasants and the ratio is larger still if Han urban incomes are compared to Uygur rural incomes. Many minority students cannot afford tuition, even the 900 yuan per year that they must pay if they are government-supported.\textsuperscript{68} The proportion of minority students in the region’s tertiary institutions decreased from 56-60 percent in the early 1990s to 51.7 percent in 1994.\textsuperscript{69} In 1997, Xinjiang’s governor asserted that 60 percent of students at Xinjiang’s 21 universities were from ethnic minorities,\textsuperscript{70} but the accuracy of this figure has not been confirmed.

At the same time that the proportion of undergraduate minority enrollment has stagnated or declined in the mid-1990s, there has not been much progress in raising the number of minority graduate students. In 1993, only three percent of graduate students were minorities,\textsuperscript{71} despite preferences for minority admission to the PRC’s small contingent of graduate students. For example, at Inner Mongolia University, the minimum examination score for Han applicants to graduate studies in 1995 was 315, while for minorities the minimum could be dropped to as low as 280.\textsuperscript{72}

Some provinces provide special financial support to minority students who go on to graduate school. Hainan minority students from impoverished families who are admitted to graduate programs, for example, may apply to have their tuition and living expenses subsidized by the provincial government.\textsuperscript{73} In other
cases, provinces provide subsidies through the universities themselves. In 1995, it was announced that over the next five years, 54 neidi universities would train 900 graduate students from Xinjiang, including 150 Ph.D. students. This intervention was made because the percentage of minority academics surpasses the proportion of minority graduate students (see Appendix B), while advanced degrees are increasingly required for an academic appointment in China. If the percentage of minorities among graduate students is not increased, minority faculty will become even more rare in the future than they are today.

One reason for the low percentage of minority graduate students is that many minority undergraduates intend to become cadres. Preferential admissions have mainly been directed at overcoming the dearth of educationally-qualified minority cadres by turning out more bachelor’s level graduates. Within this context, the affirmative action drive has born some fruit.

In 1982, minorities had less than 70 percent of the educational level of the Han, and 60 percent fewer university graduates per 1,000 population. There were 15.5 college students nationally per 10,000 population, but only 10.1 minority students. There were also large differences among minority groups. At the high end of the scale, ethnic Koreans averaged 65.2, Mongols 36.9, Man 21.0 and Hui 18.1. At the low end, the Tuja and Bouyei had 2.4, Miao 2.1, Tibetans 1.5 and Yi 1.3. By 1990, 1.42 percent of Han had a higher education. The highest attainment among minority groups was 4.3 percent (of Koreans),
while only 0.52 percent of Tibetans had reached that level. These figures, however, represented a dramatic rise from those of eight years earlier, when only 1.57 percent of Koreans and 0.117 percent of Tibetans had higher educations. Altogether, the proportion of minorities with higher education among the total population increased by almost three-fourths of a percentage point in 1982-1990.76

Education, together with affirmative action in hiring and promotion, make a significant difference in terms of minority entry into "elite" positions. In Xinjiang in the 1980s, ethnic inequality widened for the transitions to primary and lower middle school, but declined for the transitions to upper middle school and college. Ethnic occupational inequality thus declined somewhat. While minorities who fell even further behind Han in their rate of attending primary and lower middle school were likely going to end up as peasants whether or not the educational gap widened, the diminution of the Han/minority gap at the upper secondary and tertiary levels meant that a greater proportion of minority people could compete for "elite" positions.

These gains certainly did not close the Han/minorities gap: in 1990 minorities were 55 percent of the labor force in Xinjiang, but only 36.3 percent of those working in "elite" positions. Nor did the gains increase the percentage of minority cadres -- that percentage actually declined slightly. What increased access to upper middle school and university meant for minorities was that more
were entering a broadened range of "elite" positions. It is particularly notable that by 1990 a Xinjiang minority person with a high school or university education had a better chance of gaining an elite position than an equally-educated Xinjiang Han. This indicated that for minorities who manage to gain access to higher education, affirmative action plays its intended role of enlarging and diversifying the minority middle class.77

**Affirmative Action in Examinations**

Preferential admissions are facilitated by several factors. One element is to make the process of taking the national entrance examination easier for minority students by allowing them, in many cases, to use indigenous languages. Minority students who seek admission to the 13 nationalities institutes and to some of the approximately 117 minority area universities and polytechnics can become *min kao min*, "minorities taking the examination in a minority language," as opposed to *min kao han* -- "minority students taking the examination in *Hanyu*" (i.e. Chinese). Many *min kao min* students do take some of their courses in their autonomous region's main minority language, but it is also possible to take the entrance exam in an indigenous language and then enroll in classes taught solely in *Hanyu*.

Some 16-18 percent of minority tertiary students are enrolled in nationalities universities.78 An indeterminate, but large percentage of the remaining minority students attend minority area universities, rather than schools in the largely Han
coastal areas, where three-quarters of the prestigious keypoint (zhongdian) universities are located. Many minority students thus are not particularly disadvantaged by becoming min kao min, as they plan to study and work in their native regions. Students in autonomous regions with a large number of non-Hanyu speakers, i.e. Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and Tibet, can thus easily become min kao min; minority students who are from ethnic groups without written languages (Li, Bai, etc.) or who live in areas where the minority population is linguistically diverse (Yunnan, Guizhou, etc.) or consists overwhelmingly of Hanyu-speakers (Guangxi, Ningxia, etc.) generally cannot become min kao min.

In addition to being able, in many cases, to take the national examination in their indigenous languages, minority students can apply to some minority area institutions that have their own entrance exams. These are arranged by the local government and given in the local language. A student in Tibet, Xinjiang or Inner Mongolia who seeks to enter a university that uses Hanyu as the sole medium of instruction, moreover, may still take the national examination in a minority language. Alternatively, a graduate of a secondary school in which a minority language is used can take a "B text" (B juan) entrance exam. Although the exam is in Hanyu, it is easier than the standard one.

The amount of preferential advantage given to minority students to some extent depends on whether a student has chosen the min kao min or min kao han path. For example, in Kashgar prefecture, Xinjiang, the number of "added
points" (jia fen) awarded to the few non-native Hanyu-speaking minority students who take the national entrance examination as min kao han varies annually, but generally is in the 80-140 point range, considerably higher than the points awarded to min kao min students. Hui applicants, who are native Hanyu speakers, are given added points as minorities, but usually only 10-20. In Liangshan, min kao min applicants to normal universities take both the national examination and a test of their Yi language skills. They receive 40 added points for being minorities and have the score on the Yi language exam (50 points possible) added to their score.81

Affirmative Action Through Quotas

There are quotas for the total number of students that each university may enroll because the number of students who sit for the national entrance examination exceeds the number of seats at PRC universities, with the ratio being about 1.8:1 in 1994. A quota also distributes students among universities, according to their capacities, and within universities, in keeping with the needs of the state (guojia quyao) for trained personnel and the interests of the applicants. University departments propose their own quotas annually and negotiate with the university authorities, who in turn make a proposal to the SEC. The latter fixes the number of students to be admitted, but this quota may be negotiable. For example, in early 1993, the SEC proposed that 789,000 students be admitted to higher education nationwide. By the fall of 1993, the
actual intake ended up being 925,000.82

Quotas are thus basic to the entire admissions process at Chinese universities. Minority students, however, benefit from quotas that set aside a certain percentage of spaces for them. In Yunnan, every year about 24 percent of applicants to the province’s universities are minority students and 24 percent of admittees are minorities.83 In Xinjiang, the minimum points needed by minority students on the national entrance examination to qualify to apply to universities is also a function of an ethnic quota system. At Xinjiang University, the region’s comprehensive (zonghe) institution, the exact percentage of minority admittees varies annually, but roughly 55 percent of spaces in each new class are to be filled by minorities.84

Hainan province annually announces quotas of minority students. In Tongzha municipality, for example, where the population is 60 percent minority, 60 percent of students at Tongzha University must be minorities.85 The mechanism to ensure minority enrollment is the award of 100 or more added points to minorities who apply to nationalities institutes and 20 points to those who apply to other institutions, with the precise number of points dependent on how many minority applicants there are from Tongzha in a given year.86 In Liangshan, all university applicants receive 20 added points as an area preference (dichu youhui); minority students receive an additional 20 points. If these added points prove to inadequate, minimum score requirements can be lowered further to
fulfill minority quotas.\textsuperscript{87}

It was decided in the early 1980s that 20-25 percent of higher education students in Inner Mongolia must be from minority groups. The actual proportion initially rose to 24-25 percent and was 23 percent in the mid-1990s. This was accomplished in part by giving local minority liberal arts applicants 10 added points on the entrance exam and giving 15 points to prospective minority science majors.\textsuperscript{88} Without these added points, not more than two percent of admittees to Inner Mongolian universities would have been minorities. By 1994-1995, Inner Mongolia’s 19 tertiary institutions generally provided only a 5-10 point advantage to minority applicants, depending upon local circumstances, because the 16-17 university students per 10,000 population among Inner Mongolian minorities was higher than the national average. At the region’s leading institution, Inner Mongolia University, the minority student population was 33 percent in 1995, a stable quota required by regulation.\textsuperscript{89}

Inner Mongolia Normal University, the main training ground for teachers for minority grasslands schools, had a 1995 student body that was 49 percent ethnic Mongolians, with many of them studying in minzu ban. About 45 percent of faculty were Mongolians. These figures approach the 50 percent quota maintained by the university for both students and faculty. Minority applicants to the university’s Mongolian or bi-lingual streams generally have their entrance examination minimums lowered by 10 points, while minorities who seek entry
to the Hanyu stream have typically received an extra five points. University authorities decided that for 1995-1996, however, no preferential policy was needed, as the minority quota could be filled with applicants who met the standard admission requirements.\textsuperscript{90}

In most minority areas, however, the proportion of minority tertiary students has been well below the minority proportion of the population. In Ningxia, for example, minorities made up about 33 percent of the population in the late 1980s, but were only 18 percent of students at the seven regional institutions of higher learning. This figure nevertheless represents a rise from the 14.5 percent figure that obtained in 1983. A "quota" is now in place for Ningxia University, Ningxia Agricultural Institute and Ningxia Medical School, to recruit 20 percent of each incoming class from mainly Hui minority districts.\textsuperscript{91}

In Tibet, where it is claimed that as of 1995, 96.7 percent of the population were ethnic minorities,\textsuperscript{92} it was decided in 1980 that at least 60 percent of new entrants to tertiary institutions be minorities.\textsuperscript{93} By 1995-1996, the four tertiary institutions under the TAR government were attended by more than 4,000 students. The student body of Tibet University (Xizang daxue; founded 1985), according to a 1995 official source, is over 90 percent minority.\textsuperscript{94} Western reporters have given figures of 72 percent in 1989 and "two-thirds" in 1995 for ethnic Tibetan enrollment at the University.\textsuperscript{95} A 1995 study by Tibetologists in Beijing reported, however, that in 1992, 1004 of 1092 students enrolled at
Tibet University were minorities, i.e. 92 percent.\textsuperscript{96}

There are two other institutions of higher learning in the TAR, the Tibet Institute of Agriculture & Animal Husbandry (\textit{Xizang nongmu xueyuan}; founded 1978) and the Tibetan Traditional Medical Institute (\textit{Yao wang shan zang yi xueyuan}; founded 1989). Some 60 percent of the former and 100 percent of the latter's students were ethnic Tibetans in the early 1990s.\textsuperscript{97} The TAR government also supports a Tibet Institute of Nationalities (\textit{Xizang minzu xueyuan}; founded 1957). It is located in Xianyang, Shaanxi, however, and had a 40 percent minority enrollment in 1993.\textsuperscript{98}

In Guangxi, where 39 percent of the population was of minority ethnicity in 1995, 39.6 percent of the region's higher education students were from minorities, up from 17.7 percent in 1978 and 34.9 percent in 1989. Three of 24 tertiary institutions in Guangxi are devoted especially to training minorities.\textsuperscript{99} In Yunnan, the stable 24 percent minority enrollment over recent years indicates a quota. The figure, however, is an overall one: minorities at Yunnan University, the provincial keypoint school, were only eight percent in 1993.\textsuperscript{100} This percentage may be the result of a low quota, which was the case, for example, for Hainan University, the province's top institution, where only five percent of students need be minorities.\textsuperscript{101}

In some areas, a further ethnic disaggregation of applicants may also involve quotas. In Xinjiang quotas are set not only in terms of minorities from given
regions, but also as to the number of admittees from each ethnic group. The
cutoff (*fenshuxian*) is fixed at the points attained by the lowest-scoring students
within the ethnic groups who fill particular quotas so that the University may
achieve a proportionate distribution among all thirteen of the region's substantial
ethnic groups.\textsuperscript{102}

In Yunnan, in contrast, there is no strict relationship between representation
of minority groups in the population and the admission of students from each
group (see Appendix C). For the 10 minority groups least represented in the
tertiary student population,\textsuperscript{103} however, the province sponsors upper secondary
school cohorts in each of its eight autonomous prefectures. These are set up in
the best county-level high schools and the best teachers in the county are
assigned to teach these cohorts. It is hoped that 85 percent of the graduates of
the cohorts will go to university. An 80 yuan monthly subsidy is provided to
each, with 60 yuan coming from the provincial minority affairs commission
(*sheng minwei*) and 20 yuan from local government.\textsuperscript{104}

Locally, some applicants from minorities officially deemed to be "advanced"
receive less preference than other minorities. Those from some small or
assertedly "backward" minorities benefit from especially strong preferences. In
Yunnan, the authorities consider that the Man, Bai, Hui, Naxi minorities are on
a plane of development similar to the Han and accord them less preference than
other ethnies. On the other hand, the few Dulong, Nu and Jinuo applicants are
given 30 or more added points (cf. Appendix D). In Inner Mongolia, greater latitude in admissions is given Daur than Mongols and even more eased requirements are allowed Ewenki. Oroqen senior middle school graduates are admitted without taking the entrance examination. Although the northeastern Korean minority is much better educated on the whole than the Han and supplies a disproportionately high number of cadres in Yanbian Korean autonomous prefecture, all tertiary educational institutions in China's three northeastern provinces and in Inner Mongolia must enroll fixed quotas of Korean students. At Yanbian University, the ratio of minority students, including Koreans, is fixed at 70 percent.

**Affirmative Action Through Added Points**

Almost all minority students who apply to universities benefit from the award of added points on the entrance exam. These may add to an advantage already provided by admission with lowered scores. There is great variation, however, in the number of points awarded to minority students. Works published outside China often state that minorities receive a bonus of anywhere from 10 to 30 points, depending on the field and university. Specialists in China, however, know that the range of added points is much wider. One has stated that the extra points accorded minority status vary according to region and may be between 10 and 80 out of 630-640 points typically needed to gain admission. Another expert has it that the added points given to minorities
can range from 20 to 100.112

The situation of added points, however, is even more complex. The SEC varies by province the minimum scores needed to qualify to apply to three kinds of schools: keypoint universities, ordinary (putongde) universities and higher technical schools. A higher minimum is always needed to apply to the first of these categories. Variations in the minimums by province are based on the relationship between the total quota for students taken from each province by the universities in each category to the scores achieved by students from each province who apply to schools in each category. While cutoffs are reconfigured annually, the provincial minimums are predictably interrelated. For example, the minimum for students from Jiangsu, where scores tend to be relatively high, always greatly exceeds the minimum for students from Guizhou, where scores tend to be relatively low.

Quotas for each province’s sons and daughters are negotiated yearly between the universities and central authorities. If the center decides to increase the number of students from a certain province, it will ask universities to dip down further into the pool of applicants from that province, effectively lowering the minimum score needed for students from that province. For example, in 1989, the center decided to boost the number of Xinjiang minorities at neidi universities by lowering the minimum score for all Xinjiang applicants.113 Such moves benefit not only minority students, but also some Han students who
live -- or successfully claim residence (hukou) -- in minority areas. At the same
time, they do boost minority admissions. To fine tune the mix, the authorities
may also vary the number of added points given to min kao han and min kao
min students or vary the points by region of origin within a minority area: more,
for example, for southern Xinjiang or more for northern Xinjiang.¹¹⁴

The minimum score needed to apply also varies according to whether the
prospective major is in the sciences (li ke) or liberal arts (wen ke). Moreover,
incoming classes must be balanced by sex, with institutions attempting to select
50 percent males and 50 percent females in liberal arts and 80 percent males and
20 percent females in science and technology. The sexual quota system in
liberal arts is effectively a preference for males, who are accepted with much
lower scores than females in order to fill the male quota.¹¹⁵

Besides lowering minimum scores for areas with significant minority
populations, the number of added points for Han and minority students may be
varied annually within a province. In Hainan, the added points given minority
students may change radically from year to year, depending on how large the
gap is between the actual scores of minority and Han students. If the gap is
small, only 40-50 added points may be awarded, but if the gap is large, 100
points may be needed for ethnic balance.¹¹⁶

Added points variations can also be found within universities in response to
state policy decisions. For example, at Central Nationalities University, added
points usually vary from five to 80, "depending on the students' backgrounds."\textsuperscript{117} Min kao han students who came there from Xinjiang in 1990 had received a 100 point advantage. They learned, however, that earlier Xinjiang cohorts had received an even larger number of added points. At the same time, in response to another policy stance, the added points given the University's applicants have steadily decreased over the years\textsuperscript{118} as minority students are urged to "engage in self-strengthening" (ziqiang), so that the award of added points based on minority status will eventually not be needed.\textsuperscript{119}

**The Distribution of Affirmative Action Beneficiaries**

The percentage of minority tertiary students enrolled outside the minority areas is not known precisely, but is likely less than ten percent. In 1993, there were 163,224 minority higher education students in China and 161,103 students (Han and minority) attending autonomous area tertiary institutions. The five autonomous regions had 46,767 minority tertiary students. If we add to this the number of minority students in nine provinces with significant minority populations, there were 144,776 minority students in fourteen provincial-level jurisdictions (Appendix E[1]).

There are, however, minority people in each of China's 30 provinces and most of the universities in the 14 provinces for which we have minority higher education enrollment data are in Han areas. Most minority students thus go to university within their provinces but outside their autonomous prefectures or
counties, except for students from minorities mainly found in Tibet, Xinjiang, Guangxi and Inner Mongolia, who mostly enroll within their autonomous regions. For example, in the mid-1990s, about 21,000 Xinjiang minority students attended the 21 regional institutions; about 4,000 Xinjiang minority university students studied outside Xinjiang. All this means that only a small percentage of minority students attend national universities.

Most minority student bodies at the top PRC universities hover around the national proportion of all minority higher education students. For example, in 1993 six percent of Beijing University and five percent of Lanzhou University students were minorities. The number of added points awarded to minority applicants to these top universities varies with the ethnicity of the applicant. Those from relatively highly-educated minorities may receive only a 5-10 point advantage; those from generally less-educated ethnies receive more points. Thus the number of points accorded to minority students by their native places are not necessarily honored in the admission process of top universities. These, after all, are the schools of choice for many minority students, as they are for Han students, so that the top universities can afford to be selective among minorities.

The top schools take many students from sensitive minority regions, but whether there are any special quotas in this regard is unclear. During the 1994-1995 academic year, about 800 Tibetans studied at universities outside the TAR, many of them at keypoint schools. A large share of these students are
products of the *neidi* Tibetan boarding secondary schools system, whose graduates on average score over 100 points higher on the national entrance examination than examinees who do their studies in Tibet.\(^{124}\) In 1991, 745 of 1,600 entrance examees in the TAR were minorities. Some 350 were admitted to study at *neidi* universities, in part because of lowered minimum scores.\(^{125}\) Without lowering admission standards, the enrollment levels of Tibetan undergraduates in Tibet would only amount to 50-70 percent of what is actually attained\(^{126}\) and there would likely be hardly any Tibetans studying outside Tibet.

Further preferences are given students from frontier, pastoral and mountainous regions. At Lanzhou University, for example, the minimum score needed by minorities from these areas is lowered by 25 percent. Minority applicants from remote areas who apply to nationalities institutes also have their minimums lowered by an additional 10-40 points. Han students from remote areas may also benefit. At Northwest University for Nationalities in 1993, the minimum scores for Han and minority applicants from remote areas were lowered by 50 and 105 points respectively.\(^{127}\) In Yunnan, Han border area students (*bianjiang hanzu*), who are often very poor, receive 15-20 added points.\(^{128}\) Hainan Han students from minority areas are deemed to be from remote regions and acceded 10 added points in applying to universities within the province. Minority students from the same areas automatically receive at least 10 more
added points.\textsuperscript{129}

The extension of preferential policies to Han students living in some minority areas is not seen as part of a general effort to favor the poor: impoverished Han students from Han areas receive no preferences. Instead, the favoring of Han students from remote minority areas is seen as part of national minority policy, aiding minority areas with great development difficulties to increase their supply of ren cai (talented people).

**Conclusion: The Consequences of Affirmative Action**

As a result of lowered minimums and added points, minority students are often admitted with much lower scores on average than Han admittees. For example, in 1986 Han students admitted to Xinjiang universities averaged 435 points in science and 440 points in liberal arts; minorities averaged 300 points in science and 245 points in liberal arts. In 1987, Han students from Xinjiang admitted to keypoint universities averaged 470 points in science and 445 points in liberal arts; minority students averaged 313 and 269 points respectively.\textsuperscript{130} In the late 1980s, when a score of about 400 was the average minimum needed for admission in Han areas, Han students in Tibet needed 250 points for admission in Tibet; Tibetans could be admitted in Tibet with about 190 (210 for liberal arts; 170 for sciences).\textsuperscript{131} Despite these gaps, retention and graduation rates for minority students are not lower than for Han students. The reasons include the high retention and graduation rates of PRC undergraduates in general, the
concentration of minority students in minority area universities and nationalities institutes and the provision of preparatory classes, ethnic cohorts and tutoring for minorities.

Because a preferentially-admitted minority student is very likely to become a college graduate, minorities in China actively seek this benefit and "Han" people seek to be reclassified as minorities. From 1982 to 1990, some 14 million minority people who previously had elected to be classified as Han had themselves reclassified as minorities. The Han population rose about 10 percent in 1982-1990; the minority population increased by more than 35 percent, with half the increase attributable to changes in ethnic status (minzu chengfen).

Some Han claimed a minority progenitor who lived hundreds of years earlier and applied (usually unsuccessfully) for minority status, most often in order to make themselves eligible for preferential admissions. Five million people had applications to change ethnic status pending in 1990 when the process was brought to a close by government fiat. Han can, however, still seek a minority spouse in order to gain the benefits of preferential policies for their children. Even where there is no calculation of this kind involved in choice of a marriage partner, the children of "mixed" marriages are overwhelmingly registered as minorities. Other Han, with no minority background, have purchased forged papers identifying them as minorities, in many cases to give their offspring an advantage in applying to universities. At least one set of corrupt official were
imprisoned for selling such papers.\textsuperscript{133}

There is anecdotal evidence that preferential admissions for minorities are envied and resented by many Han. Calls emanating from elite circles to scrap preferential admissions on grounds of quality control and equity date back at least to the mid-1980s.\textsuperscript{134} In some places, such as rural Yunnan, these are echoed because the Han there are only slightly better off than their impoverished minority neighbors.\textsuperscript{135} While special admissions for minorities are more resented than any other preferential policy in China, save family planning preferences,\textsuperscript{136} the resentment is not strong enough to have been publicly displayed. This is so despite the fact that grievances of all kinds have, from time to time (e.g., during the Cultural Revolution and in 1989) been very publicly aired in China. When a single Han instructor at Xinjiang University in the 1980s put up a poster that argued that preferential admissions are unfair to Han, he received no manifest support from other Han, while minority students staged a protest in which they pointed out that they (then) could only take the entrance examination in \textit{Hanyu}.\textsuperscript{137}

It has been claimed that the lack of tensions over preferential admissions in China can be traced to the small difference in social rewards, particularly in income, made by a university degree.\textsuperscript{138} While this explanation was likely true as far as it went, there are additional reasons that preferential admissions have not produced obvious tensions. First, minorities are not the only group who
have received preferential treatment in university admissions. The best keypoint
senior middle school students have not had to take the national entrance
examination, but are picked directly by prestigious universities. Moreover, some
students are admitted to keypoint senior middle schools without taking the
entrance examination, usually because they reside near the school, in a
neighborhood with many government officials, or the schools may lower the
entrance requirements for offspring of officials in order to curry favor with
them.\textsuperscript{139}

Beginning in the mid-1980s, students "sponsored" by enterprises and local
governments and self-supporting students began to be admitted to higher
education with scores 30 points below those of the centrally-recruited, publicly-
supported (\textit{tongzhao gongfei}) students. By 1988, there were tens of thousands
of such students, mostly in specialized two or three-year programs. In 1991,
self-supporting students and students who were supported enterprise or local
government units amounted to 11 percent of the total student bodies at PRC
universities and by 1993 the figure was 39 percent. Beginning in 1994, the
distinction between these students and others began to fade, since all students
were to be charged the same fees. There are still students who might be
admitted with lower scores for other reasons, however, such as athletic prowess
or political leadership.\textsuperscript{140} Athletes of a certain ranking are considered to be
"special talents" (\textit{tesu rencai}), as are municipal and provincial-level "three good
students" (san hao sheng)(good in study, athletics and politics/morals). A student is this category might, for example, be awarded 15 added points.

Second, preferential admissions are in the main, practiced by minority institutions. While many predominantly Han institutions of higher learning engage in affirmative action as well, most preferential admissions scarcely, if at all, diminish the opportunities of Han students. In fact, it can be argued that preferential admissions for minorities have actually benefitted some Han. These include not only Han in certain minority areas who may get added points on this account, but also Han who have benefited from the rapid expansion of higher education in China that was, in some measure, impelled by the need to accommodate increasingly larger number of minority students. The majority of the population of the minority areas, after all, is Han.

Third, the PRC state has long maintained that minority people were sharply oppressed in the "old society" by elites who were, in the main, Han and has seen to the establishment of the autonomous areas. Just as in the former Soviet Union, where the Slavic majority regarded the Central Asian "republics" of the USSR as under the rightful control of their eponymous minorities, ¹⁴¹ many Chinese have come to accept that having an autonomous government must result in some special rights for at least the predominant ethnie of the autonomous area.

As social differentiation accelerates and economic reform matures in China,
so that fewer opportunities will be available to those with a relatively low level of education, university training will likely become more closely correlated with economic success. Already the "socialist market economy" of the 1990s has impacted preferential policies several negative ways. Hiring quotas for minority workers, which exist on paper in some minority areas, have been rendered unenforceable by the national Industrial Law (qiye fa)\textsuperscript{142} and minority officials complain that

\begin{quote}
[\text{With the transition from planned economy to market economy, some preferential policies designed for minority areas have been weakened or made defunct. On the other hand, some new policies, do not take enough consideration of the special situations of minority areas [and] our development has been restrained by these policies.}\textsuperscript{143}
\end{quote}

As a university education becomes more necessary to economic (and political) success, affirmative action may become a subject for debate, at least in elite circles, despite the fact that the absolute number of places in universities will probably continue to expand very rapidly in China. That debate, should it occur, will be a major diversion from the more critical questions caused by the reforms, for example, the growth of illiteracy occurring both among minority and Han populations due to the demand by rural parents for the labor-power of their children.\textsuperscript{144}

It may also be queried whether support for the continuation of preferential policies will be sustained in the face of the ever-rising crescendo of Chinese nationalism. Despite the disclaimers of the PRC state, the latter is firmly Han-
centered, with the Han seen as the epitome of the Zhonghua minzu (Chinese ethnic) that is being forged from an amalgam of the Han and minorities. As misplaced efforts to "Sinicize" (Hanhua) the origins and identity of minority people go forward,145 it is not inconceivable that elite voices against emphasizing the "special characteristics" of minorities, including the continued need for autonomy and affirmative action, will be raised in the early Twenty-first century, as they were during the Cultural Revolution.

The other side of the coin of resentment of preferential policies is that some minority people regard such policies with reservations. Many minority intellectuals criticize preferential policies as too weak, for example because they help get one into the university, but do not provide sufficient support for promotion once one has graduated and entered a workunit.146 It has also been reported, however, that some minority students who were admitted under a quota system and had a hard time with their studies, felt inferior to their Han classmates. This was the case, for example, at Xinjiang Teacher's University (Xinjiang shifan daxue) in the mid-to-late 1980s and the reaction has been even more pronounced at national universities.147 Some minority students may therefore view preferential admissions as a double-edged sword, which improves their lot, but at a psychological cost. At this point, most minority students seem quite willing to pay that cost, but if attacks on preferences of the kind found in other countries emerge in China, the burden on minority students can expect to
increase exponentially.

Economic reforms have thus far not reversed the policy of affirmative action in higher education. The absolute number of minority graduates has slowly increased from year to year and the training provided to minorities is producing an increasing number of qualified technical and professional cadres. A number of problem areas can be observed, however. The percentage of minority students lags behind that of minorities in the general population of China and seems to be decreasing. Minority graduates now often seek economic opportunities outside their native regions. If the effort to produce trained elites for the minority areas is dissipated because of the mobility that attends reform, then support for affirmative action may wane among national and minority leaders, both of whom want to see highly-trained minority people mainly work in the minority areas.

Affirmative action necessarily highlights the ethnicity of its beneficiaries. Grouping minority students in preparatory classes and ethnic cohorts at PRC universities promotes, rather than diminishes ethnic consciousness. This process contributes to occasional manifestations of ethnic political consciousness among Uygur and Tibetan students in neidi cities. While these events may at times worry PRC leaders, it does seem that most beneficiaries of preferential admissions will become the professionally-competent and politically-loyal graduates that the policy is designed to produce. This alone may guarantee the
future of affirmative action in higher education in China.
### Appendix A: Minority Students at PRC Universities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Students</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949-1950</td>
<td>1,285</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-1951</td>
<td>2,117</td>
<td>1.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951-1952</td>
<td>2,948</td>
<td>1.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952-1953</td>
<td>5,536</td>
<td>2.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953-1954</td>
<td>7,999</td>
<td>3.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954-1955</td>
<td>8,883</td>
<td>3.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-1956</td>
<td>14,159</td>
<td>3.47</td>
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<tr>
<td>1956-1957</td>
<td>16,101</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957-1958</td>
<td>22,421</td>
<td>3.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958-1959</td>
<td>28,163</td>
<td>3.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-1961</td>
<td>29,921</td>
<td>3.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-1962</td>
<td>28,729</td>
<td>3.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962-1963</td>
<td>24,825</td>
<td>3.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-1965</td>
<td>21,870</td>
<td>3.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-1975</td>
<td>30,607</td>
<td>6.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-1976</td>
<td>36,578</td>
<td>6.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-1977</td>
<td>34,460</td>
<td>5.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-1978</td>
<td>36,030</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978-1979</td>
<td>37,378</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-1980</td>
<td>42,944</td>
<td>3.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-1981</td>
<td>51,220</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-1982</td>
<td>53,739</td>
<td>4.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-1983</td>
<td>59,630</td>
<td>4.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983-1984</td>
<td>69,633</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984-1985</td>
<td>94,095</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years</td>
<td>Students</td>
<td>% Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-1986</td>
<td>99,468</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-1987</td>
<td>118,735</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987-1988</td>
<td>125,422</td>
<td>6.1</td>
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<td>1988-1989</td>
<td>131,599</td>
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<td>1989-1990</td>
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<td>1990-1991</td>
<td>141,767</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991-1992</td>
<td>152,858</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992-1993</td>
<td>163,224</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993-1994</td>
<td>178,000</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994-1995</td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-1996</td>
<td>187,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


42
### Appendix B: Minority Faculty at PRC Universities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Faculty</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>1.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>1,941</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>3,311</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>3,020</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>5,876</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>7,150</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>7,808</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>8,364</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>9,150</td>
<td>3.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>10,791</td>
<td>3.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>10,841</td>
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<tr>
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<td>12,775</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>14,236</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>16,900</td>
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<td>1989</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>17,533</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991</td>
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<td>1992</td>
<td>19,400</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: SEC, Minority Education Dep't, private communication; Guo Sheng, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 300; Liu Yingjie, *op. cit.*, pp. 1546; 2055; *Zhongguo shehui tongji ziliao*, pp. 170, 182; *Zhongguo shehui tongji ziliao*, pp. 146, 179; Liu Yingjie, *op. cit.*

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Appendix C: Minority University Admittees for Various Ethnic Groups (total=5200 per annum) in Relation to Population of Minority Groups in Yunnan Province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Population (mill.)</th>
<th>Admittees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bai</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yi</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hani</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>120-130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhuang</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dai</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miao</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>50-60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lahu, Jinbo</td>
<td>.3-.4</td>
<td>20-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hui, Meng, Man, Naxi</td>
<td>less than .3</td>
<td>more than 200 each</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix D: Translation, "Minority Students Special Consideration Policies" (Minzu sheng zhaogu zhengce), handwritten document, Yunnan Education Commission, 9 September 1994.

1. In border counties and counties that practice border policies, minority applicants will receive 30 added points. Han applicants born and raised in those areas and Han who have gone there with their parents for at least ten years will have 20 added points, but if the latter have gone to high schools in neidi, they will have 10 points subtracted from their added points.

2. The 20+ minorities in Yunnan, except the Bai, Hui, Naxi, Yi and Zhuang, will receive 10 added points, even if they live in neidi [but apply to universities in Yunnan].

3. Yi and Zhuang applicants who live in neidi will receive 10 added points if they have a rural hukou.

4. Minority applicants from high, cold, and poor mountainous areas, so designated by provincial or prefectural governments, and children of teachers who have worked for more than 10 years in these areas and continue to work there, will receive 10 [more] added points.

5. Bai, Hui and Naxi applicants from neidi and Yi and Zhuang urban applicants
from *neidi* and minorities who enter Yunnan from outside, will have priority for admission if they have the same qualifications [as Han students].
Appendix E(1): Proportion of Minorities Among Tertiary Students in the Five Autonomous Regions and Nine Provinces (early 1990s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Students</th>
<th>No. Minority</th>
<th>% Minorities Among Students</th>
<th>% of Minorities in Province</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inner Mongolia</td>
<td>8,530</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>19.42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guangxi</td>
<td>13,380</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>38.24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tibet</td>
<td>1,578</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>96.18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ningxia</td>
<td>2,228</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>33.27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xinjiang</td>
<td>20,991</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>62.42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaoning</td>
<td>18,934</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15.62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jilin</td>
<td>9,766</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10.24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hubei</td>
<td>7,515</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunan</td>
<td>9,003</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7.95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sichuan</td>
<td>8,776</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guizhou</td>
<td>10,109</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>32.43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yunnan</td>
<td>10,006</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>33.41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gansu</td>
<td>4,794</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8.30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qinghai</td>
<td>2,638</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>42.14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>144,766</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix E (2): Number of minority students enrolled in higher education institutions in autonomous and non-autonomous areas of nine provinces in 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>No. of minorities in autonomous area institutions</th>
<th>No. of Minorities in Non-autonomous area institutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liaoning</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>18,879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jilin</td>
<td>2,522</td>
<td>7,244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hubei</td>
<td>2,469</td>
<td>5,046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunan</td>
<td>1,712</td>
<td>7,291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sichuan</td>
<td>3,122</td>
<td>5,654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guizhou</td>
<td>1,595</td>
<td>8,514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yunnan</td>
<td>2,591</td>
<td>7,415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gansu</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>4,405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qinghai</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>2,380</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hasi Bagen, op. cit.
Notes

1. Devanasan Nesiah, Discrimination without reason? preferential policies in the USA, India and Malaysia (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997).


8. There are 159 minority autonomous areas (5 regions [qu], 30 prefectures [zhou] and 124 counties [xian]), plus perhaps 3,000 ethnic townships and


12. Of 311 poor counties listed by China's State Council, 143 are mainly inhabited by minorities. "Educational help offered to poor areas," Xinhua, January 14, 1996, Item no. 011498. In 1992, when the autonomous areas population was 13.6 percent of China's total, the Gross Value of Industrial and Agricultural Output (GOV) of the autonomous was only 6.7 percent of national GOV. Huang Gongxue, Dangdai Zhongguo minzu renwu (Contemporary China's Ethnic Tasks) (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo, 1993), pp. 221-223.


15. For a case study, see Barry Sautman, "The Impact of 'Affirmative Action' on Han-Minority Relations: the Case of Xinjiang," paper presented at the 1996 Association of Asian Studies annual meeting, Honolulu, Hawaii, USA.

16. Interview with head of Yunnan Minority Affairs Committee Policy Institute, Kunming, July 9, 1996.


18. Interview with Li Zi, Director of the Institute of Ethnic Studies of the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences (Xinjiang Shehui Kexue yuan, minzu yanjiusuo), June 27, 1995; interview with Zhao Shu, Deputy Director of the Beijing Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing minwei), June 23, 1995.


21. Interview with Hainan provincial People’s Congress Standing Committee Minority Work Committee, Haikou, July 8, 1996.


29. The quanguo gaodeng yuanxiao tongyi zhaosheng ruxue kaoshi or All-China examination for the admission of students to higher-level institutions and universities, abbreviated as gao kao.


31. On the three types of minority higher education, see Guo Sheng, Xin Zhongguo jiaoyu sishi nian (Forty years of New China’s education) (Fuzhou: Fujian jiaoyu chubanshe), pp. 334-335.


33. "State Council issues circular on minority autonomy law," Xinhua, January 12, 1992. Item no. 00112091. See also Ismail Amat, "Guanyu fazhan minzu jiao yu de ruogan wenti" (Certain issues in developing minority education), Minzu Yanjiu no. 3 (10 May 1991), pp. 15.


37. Article 9 of the "Regulation on Work with Urban National Minorities" [Xinhua, October 22, 1993, in BBC/SWB, 9 November 1993, Fe/1841/S1] states that "City people's governments should take appropriate measures to . . . run ethnic classes efficiently at all levels and to give preferential treatment to ethnic classes in the allocation of funds and teachers."


44. Interview with Dong Xieming, head of Minority Education Office of the Provincial Education Commission of Hainan, Haikou, July 1, 1996.


56. The 1994-1995 figure in Appendix A is based on the most conservative estimate of the number of PRC university students (2.8 million) and the 160,000 minority students in China in 1995.


61. Zhang Qiang, "Zhao sheng "binggui" ying chongfen kaolu minzu xuesheng de shiji kunnan" (In enrolling students through the combined tracks system, the actual difficulties of minority students should be fully considered), *Zhongguo gaodeng jiaoyu* no. 6 (1995), p. 39.


67. Interviews with officers of the People’s Political Consultative Conference of Xishuangbanna, Jinghong, 21 and 24 April 1996.


72. Interview with Inner Mongolia University officials, Hohhot, 9 April 1995.

73. "Hainan’s minority ethnic students encouraged to seek higher degrees," Xinhua, November 21, 1996, Item no. 1121106.


75. Minority university graduates per 10,000 persons equalled 62 percent of the nationwide figure. Zhongguo shehui tongji ziliao (China Social Statistical Data) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1987), pp. 170, 182.


79. Kormondy, op. cit., p. 166. For example, the vast majority of the 952 tertiary students from Xinjiang’s Turpan prefecture who matriculated in 1994 did so at Turpan institutions; almost all the rest attended other Xinjiang institutions. Interview with a Turpan bureau chief, Turpan, 2 July 1995. Lijiang Naxi district produces about 40 minority university students each year, but only a few go to keypoint universities and most go to nationalities institutes. Interview with
official, Lijiang District Education Commission, Lijiang, 17 July 1996. Every
year seven to eight Zhaojue County students go on to higher education, but most
go to Southwest Nationalities University or the Central Nationalities University.
Interview with head of Zhaojue County Personnel Office, Zhaojue, 24 July 1996.

80. Postiglione, op. cit., p. 38; Bernard Olivier, *The implementation of China's
nationality policy in the northeastern Provinces* (San Francisco: Mellen Research
University Press 1993), p. 242, Jan-Ingvar Lofstedt, "Education for national
minorities in China: an overview," *Journal of Negro Education* 36, no. 3 (1987),

81. Interview, Liangshan Ethnic Affairs Commission. Minorities are 45.4
percent of the Liangshan population.

82. Liu Renjing, "Gaoxiao zhaosheng: zengzhang sudu yao shidan" (College and
university admissions: the rate of growth must be appropriate), *Zhongguo jiaoyu
bao*, no. 1821 (April 7, 1994), p. 1, in *Chinese Education & Society*, v. 28,

83. Interview, official of the Yunnan Minority Education Commission, Kunming,
10 July 1996; "Yunnan excels in ethnic minority education," *Xinhua*, August 24,
1995, Item no. 08241123.

84. Interviews with Prof. Wang Jamin and Uyghur students, Central
Nationalities University. June 12, 1995; interview with a Turpan prefecture
bureau chief, July 8, 1995. Because the cohort of college-level technical
students (*dazhuan xuesheng*) at the university is disproportionately Han, overall Han
and minority students each make up a half-share of the student body.

85. Interview with Dong Xueming.

86. Interview with officials of the Tongzha Li Autonomous Prefecture Education

87. Interview with Liangshan Ethnic Affairs Commission.

88. There are actually five kinds of examinations: sciences, liberal arts,
languages, athletics and fine arts. Takers of the last three of these examinations
account for less than five percent of all examinees. If the rest of China is like
Guangdong in this respect, science candidates outnumber liberal arts candidates
by about two to one. Ikel. *op. cit.*, p. 166.

89. Interview Mongolian intellectuals, Hohhot, April 9, 1995; interview with
Rong Shen, vice-director of the Inner Mongolian Ethnic Affairs Commission,
Hohhot, April 13, 1995.

90. Interview with officials of Inner Mongolia Normal University, Hohhot, April 13, 1995.

91. Ningxia Hui Education Office, "Zai tansu he gaihe zhong fazhan minzu jiaoyu" (Develop Minority Education in the Process of Exploration and Reform), Minzu jiaoyu yanjiu, no. 1 (1990), pp. 7-11.


94. "Tibetan language used widely in Tibetan classrooms," July 11, 1995, Xinhua, Item no. 071182. Supporters of the exiled Dalai Lama dispute this figure. See Anders Andersen, "Development and cultural destruction in Tibet," WTN, March 19, 1995, which asserts that 55 percent of the students enrolled at Tibet University are "Chinese." Pema Thinley, "Educating Chinese at Tibetan expense," Tibetan Bulletin (July-August, 1996), pp. 11-14, states that "[I]n all the faculties of modern subjects in the Tibet University, Lhasa, the overwhelming majority of the students are Chinese . . . ."


97. Yang Chaogi, "Lizu xizang shijij; cujin goujiaojia gaiji" (Gain a foothold in Tibet's reality: promote the reform and development of higher education," Zhongguo gaodeng jiaoyu (October, 1993), pp. 18-19; "Tibet trains more agricultural managers, technicians," Xinhua, May 8, 1990, Item no. 0508168; "College of Tibetan medicine set up in Lhasa," Xinhua, September 3, 1989, in BBC/SWB, September 6, 1989, FE/0554/B2/1. The Agricultural & Animal Husbandry Institute for 1990 was 80 percent minority, if higher technical students (dazhuan xuesheng), middle technical students (zhongzhuaxue xuesheng) training students (peixun xuesheng), and preparatory students (jichu yuke xuesheng) were added to the figure for regular university students (benke xuesheng). Yin Zhang, ed., Zhongguo gaodeng yuanxiao (China's higher

98. Kormondy, op. cit., p. 162. Applying the ethnic proportions stated above to total enrollment figures for 1993 derived from Zhongguo jiaoyu shiye tongji nianjian, 1994, pp. 114-141), the overall percentage of minorities at Tibetan higher learning institutions depends on whether the Nationalities Institute is within that category. If so, minority enrollment in the four schools is 64 percent. See also Zhongguo jiaoyu nianjian, 1993 (Beijing: Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe, 1993), p. 691 (in 1992 overall percentage for four institutions was 63.4). If the Nationalities Institute is excluded from the calculations, overall enrollment in the three institutions actually in Tibet is about 78 percent.


102. Interview with Wang Jianmin, etc.

103. Miao, Yao, Lahu, Jipo, Wa, Lisu, Hani, Dai, Dehong and Bulang.

104. Interview with Yunnan Education Commission officials.

105. Interview with faculty of Yunnan Ethnic Studies Institute, Kunming, April 19, 1996.

106. Interview with Inner Mongolia Normal University officials.


108. Olivier, op. cit., p. 245; Postiglione, op. cit., p. 32.


111. Lu Yumin, State Minority Affairs Commission, Education Department Deputy Office Chief, Interview, June 30, 1994. The figure of 630-640 points needed to gain admission doubtless refers to keypoint universities. The maximum number of points on the 1996 entrance examination was 750.


114. Interview with a Kirghiz student, Central Nationalities University, June 12, 1995.


116. Interview with Dong Xueming; Interview with officials of the Hainan Province Institute of Nationalities, Office of Research in the National Economy, Tongzha, July 5, 1996. Only two or three minority students per year from Sanya, the second largest Hainan city, are admitted to keypoint universities without "special consideration (zaoag)". Interview with officials of Sanya, Hainan People's Congress Standing Committee, CCP Party committee, Ethnic Affairs and Religion Office, July 5, 1996.


118. Kirghiz student interview; Wang Jiamin, interview.

119. Lu Yumin, interview.


125. "Tibetan students depart for universities in China," *Xinhua*, September 11, 1995, in *BBC/SWB*, September 14, 1991, FE/1177/B2/1. The Department of Information & International Relations of the Tibetan exile administration in "The State of education in Tibet today," in *WTN*, November 18, 1994, argues that the majority of seats at universities inside and outside the TAR that are reserved for Tibetan students actually "go to Chinese students due only to the fact that they have finished school from the 'TAR' or due to their Tibet residency registration."


128. Interview with faculty of Yunnan Ethnic Studies Institute.

129. Interview with Sanya Education Office officials, July 6, 1996; interview with Hainan People's Congress officials.

130. Cheng Shengykuan, "Xinjiang jiaoyu de fangxiang zhanxian shi tigao zhiliang," (Raising quality is the orientation of the front in Xinjiang's education), *Xinjiang shehui kexue*. no. 3 (June 15, 1989), pp. 38-62; Ba Jiankun, *op. cit.*, p. 304.


135. Interview with Yunnan Ethnic Studies Institute official.


