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MNC CONTROL OF FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES: A CROSS-LEVEL THEORIZING

Abstract

To improve understanding of the manner in which multinational corporations control foreign subsidiaries, we examine the relationships between two types of controls (one input and one process/behavioral) used by the expatriate managers and host country national managers' overall job satisfaction. We further investigate the moderating effects of expatriate managers' parent company commitment and job discretion on the aforementioned relationships. Given the cross-level theorizing advanced in this study, we investigate these issues using survey data from 139 expatriate general managers and 324 host country national managers working at 139 hotels. The findings from this study support most of the proposed relationships.

Key words: MNC control; expatriate general managers; cross-level moderating effects; HCN overall job satisfaction

Organizational control has long been the focus of both academics and practitioners (Eisenhardt, 1985; Flamholtz, Das, & Tsui, 1985; Ouchi, 1977, 1979). Control is of particular importance to the multinational corporation (MNC), a complex entity with a group of geographically dispersed and goal disparate subsidiaries (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990). Managing foreign subsidiaries has been a very pertinent and challenging issue in international strategy when focusing on MNC control over subsidiaries (Ambos & Schlegelmilch, 2007; Egelhoff, 1984; Kobrin, 1988).

Expatriate managers have been identified as one mechanism through which MNCs can exert control over their subsidiaries (Belderbos & Heijltjes, 2005; Boyacigiller, 1990; Gong, 2003). The expatriate assignment not only reflects MNC's direct control of its subsidiaries (Delios & Björkman, 2000) but also affects the effectiveness of its strategy implementation and subsequent firm performance (Gaur, Delios, & Singh, 2007; Gong, 2003). The basic assumption underlying such staffing control is that expatriates identify with the MNC's (or parent company) values and beliefs and, subsequently, help to make sure that the subsidiaries and their employees behave in a manner consistent with the MNC's goals and objectives (Egelhoff, 1984; Gong, 2003). However, when viewed from the social control and agency perspective, "headquarters executives at the foreign subsidiary can serve an entirely different purpose altogether" (O'Donnell, 2000: 532) and may not necessarily be committed to MNCs (cf. Gregersen & Black, 1992). Extant research does not extend beyond this point to explore the mechanisms expatriate managers use to assure parent company goals are realized by foreign subsidiaries.

Moreover, the extant literature on organizational control have been focused "almost exclusively on understanding the characteristics and effects of control in large, mature organizations" (Cardinal, Sitkin, & Long, 2004: 411) with emphasis on firm- or business unit-

level outcomes, such as innovation (Cardinal, 2001; Govindarajan & Fisher, 1990). To the best of our knowledge, virtually no study thus far has examined the impact of different types of control mechanisms (i.e., input, behavior/process, and output) utilized in these large, mature organizations including MNCs on the individuals, such as the host country nationals (HCNs) who work at the foreign subsidiaries. HCNs are a vital asset to the MNCs because: 1) they have the knowledge of the local market, its business practices and cultural preferences (Kobrin, 1988); 2) they have the advantage of language proficiency, lower cost, and immunity to any possible government restrictions on expatriate assignment and thus are the future source of local managerial talent (Delios & Björkman, 2000); 3) they serve as an important link between the MNC and the host culture and help MNCs overcome the liability of foreignness and gain access to local knowledge networks (Singh, 2007). Therefore, limited attention given to the influence of control mechanisms on individual-level outcomes (see Ouchi & Johnson, 1978 for an exception), in general, and HCNs, in particular, deserves considerable merit.

Furthermore, most of the research on strategic control within MNCs has focused on macro differences in control systems across entire MNCs without consideration for subsidiary differences within an MNC (Gupta & Govindarajan, 1991). Studies have shown that an MNC indeed treats its subsidiaries differently (e.g., Chang & Taylor, 1999; Kim, Prescott, & Kim, 2005). In addition to these between subsidiary differences, there are also likely to be within subsidiary differences in terms of how an expatriate manager heading a subsidiary treats the HCNs. Recognizing the multi-level nature of the MNC calls for multilevel theorizing (e.g., Chan & Makino, 2007) and, as suggested by Gupta and Govindarajan (1991), a less macro perspective may provide further insights into the impact of control mechanisms.

The main objective of this study, therefore, is to conduct a theory-based examination of the cross-level control exerted by MNCs. Specifically, we propose and test a model of MNC control whereby the MNC's use of expatriate managers and their control behaviors influence HCNs. First, expatriate managers utilize specific control mechanisms to guide, direct, and influence HCN attitudes (i.e., overall job satisfaction) and behaviors. Here, job satisfaction is defined as "a pleasurable or positive emotional state resulting from the appraisal of one's job or job experience" (Locke, 1976: 1300). By integrating organizational control perspective with leadership theories, we highlight the multi-level nature of MNCs and illustrate these cross-level relationships between expatriate managers who manage foreign subsidiaries and HCNs working under them. As such, this study first contributes to the MNC literature.

Second, the potential moderating effects of an MNC's informal and formal control mechanisms that MNC headquarters utilize to manage expatriate managers on the relationship between expatriates' use of control mechanisms and HCN manager job satisfaction are also examined. Although they exert control at the subsidiary level through their leadership behaviors, expatriate managers themselves are also subjected to formal and informal control mechanisms utilized by the parent MNC (i.e., the extent to which expatriate managers are afforded with discretion [formal control] and the expatriate's degree of organizational commitment [informal control]). These MNC's informal and formal control has bearing on the relationship between expatriate manager control mechanisms and HCN overall job satisfaction. Thus, our study contributes to organizational control literature, as this is one of the few studies that have simultaneously examined the cross-level moderating effects of informal and formal controls mechanisms on the relationship between input and process/behavior controls, and individual-level outcomes (cf. Cardinal, 2001).

Third, to examine these research questions, we employ the multilevel methodology of Random Coefficient Modeling (RCM; also known as Hierarchical Linear Modeling). RCM is an analytical method that attempts to address the non-independence between effects and its ease of use makes it attractive to strategic management researchers (Misangyi, Elms, Greckhamer, & Lepine, 2006), which is an additional empirical contribution of the study. Finally, we illustrate the utility of integrating macro- (organizational control) and micro- (leadership) theoretical perspectives, which contribute to the expatriate experience literature with its predominantly micro-focused orientation (Brock, Shenkar, Shoham, & Siscovick, 2008).

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

Organizational control

Organizational control is defined as any processes by which organizations or managers direct attention, motivate, and encourage employees and groups to behave in ways that lead to the attainment of organizationally desired objectives (Eisenhardt, 1985; Flamholtz et al., 1985; Ouchi, 1977). Multiple taxonomies of control ranging from Etzioni's (1961) three principles of coercion, material rewards and internalized control to Ouchi's (1980) control by markets, bureaucracies or clans have been used by organizational theorists. They can be aggregated generally into two broad categories of control: formal control and informal control (Cardinal et al., 2004; Jaworski, 1988; Kirsch, 1996; Ouchi, 1979). Formal control is a performance evaluation process based on monitoring and evaluating the behavior or outputs of employees (Eisenhardt, 1985; Ouchi, 1979). Informal control is a socialization process based on elimination of goal incongruence between individuals and emphasizes human resource policies such as selection, training, and socialization (Eisenhardt, 1985; Ouchi, 1979).

Organizational control literature has examined three frequently used types of control strategy: input, behavior/process and output control. Input control refers to the control mechanisms that manage resources acquired by the firm, including human, material, and financial resources. Behavior or process control refers to the control mechanisms to manage task activities that transform inputs into outputs. In other words, behavior control governs the work process. Output control refers to the control mechanisms that manage product and service outcomes by regulating results or emphasizing particular outcomes to be attained (Cardinal, 2001; Cardinal et al., 2004). The literature has identified antecedent conditions for each control strategy, such as outcome measurability and task programmability (Eisenhardt, 1985; Govindarajan & Fisher, 1990; Kirsch, 1996; Ouchi, 1977). The consequences of control mechanisms such as firm innovation were also empirically examined on business units and organizations (Cardinal, 2001; Eisenhardt, 1985; Govindarajan & Fisher, 1990; Kirsch, 1996).

Nonetheless, limited attention has been paid to the impact of control on individual outcomes. It seems that organizational control literature has assumed away the controllee's divergent preferences in accepting or resisting the control attempts as unimportant and, thus, has neglected the human side of employee motivation. Consistent with agency theory which explicitly recognizes the divergence of interests and preferences of employees (Eisenhardt, 1985), we argue that the individual level outcomes resulting from different control strategies should also be taken into consideration.

Moreover, concurring with Cardinal's (2001: 22) point that previous research has predominantly viewed organizational control, particular behavior control "as a mechanism that stifles creativity and fosters employee dissatisfaction," we also think that a broader conceptualization of control might be particularly effective in analyzing the control impact on

HCNs. Furthermore, although different types of control may be used in combinations (Chang & Taylor, 1999), there are few studies that explore them at the same time (e.g., Cardinal, 2001). Therefore, by examining the impact of different control mechanisms used by expatriate managers in subsidiaries, the present study is able to demonstrate the mechanisms through which MNCs control subsidiaries through expatriates.

Agency problem and control issue in MNCs

An agency problem exists when there is divergence of interests between principals and agents (Eisenhardt, 1985; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Agency theory assumes that information asymmetry between the agents and principals will result in the agents' self-interested behaviors which may not be consistent with the interests of principals (Eisenhardt, 1989). In international business, the headquarter–foreign subsidiary relationship can be considered a type of principal–agent relationship in which the MNC headquarters delegates work and responsibilities to foreign subsidiaries (Roth & O'Donnell, 1996). In the context of an MNC, “an agency problem exists if subsidiary management makes decisions that are not congruent with those desired by headquarters, due to goal incongruence between headquarters and the subsidiary and self-interested behavior on the part of subsidiary management” (O'Donnell, 2000: 526).

Information asymmetry can exist between headquarters and a subsidiary because the subsidiary has greater knowledge of its environment, actions, and performance than headquarters. It can be difficult and expensive for headquarters to obtain complete and accurate information about subsidiary activities and performance, thus making headquarters more dependent on the subsidiary for information (Gong, 2003; Roth & O'Donnell, 1996). Increased uncertainty associated with agency costs of managing a subsidiary in a foreign location increases the

perceived need and greater attempts by the MNC to control it (Boyacigiller, 1990; Chang & Taylor, 1999).

A framework of MNCs control of subsidiaries

The present study examines the impact of MNCs' control of subsidiaries on subsidiary functional managers' job satisfaction by taking a cross-level perspective. First, we study the direct effect of control mechanisms used by expatriate managers in the subsidiary on the job satisfaction of HCN (functional) managers. We focus on overall job satisfaction of HCN functional managers for three major reasons: 1) as noted before, a limited attention has been given to the individual level outcomes in organizational control literature; 2) job satisfaction is arguably one of the most important and widely researched topics in industrial, organizational, and social psychology (Ironson, Smith, Brannick, Gibson, & Paul, 1989). For instance, Locke (1976) estimated the number of articles written on this subject to be already at 3,350; 3) meta-analytic studies have found job satisfaction to be related to individual employees' task (e.g., Riketta, 2008) and contextual (e.g., Fassina, Jones, & Uggerslev, 2008) performances. While job satisfaction has not been considered critical in multinational control literature (or international strategy literature, in general: e.g., Birnbaum & Wong, 1985), job attitudes, including job satisfaction, have been found to influence performance at the individual (e.g., Harrison, Newman, & Roth, 2006; Riketta, 2008) and organizational (e.g., Ostroff, 1992; Ryan, Schmit, & Johnson, 1996) levels.

The use of expatriate managers in foreign subsidiaries is regarded as a means of control through monitoring or regulating¹ the behaviors of the subsidiary (Boyacigiller, 1990; Egelhoff, 1984; Muralidharan & Hamilton, 1999). Given that top management team members'

¹ Consistent with Cardinal (2001), we are taking a broader perspective conceptualization of control where control mechanisms do not necessarily lead to negative outcomes.

performance at a foreign subsidiary (which is our study context) is difficult to quantify² (cf. Elron, 1997; Gupta, 1987; Roth, Schweiger, & Morrison, 1991), we focus on two well-known types of control, input and process/behavior, in this study. Furthermore, we also consider an expatriate manager's use of control mechanisms to differ among the host country national managers he or she directs, as exemplified by theoretical and empirical research on vertical dyad linkages (Dansereau, Graen, & Haga, 1975) or later became to be known as leader-member-exchange theory (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995). This body of literature has illustrated abundantly that a particular leader does not treat his/her subordinates equally but differentiate among them.

Second, we also investigate the potential moderating effects of job discretion and expatriate parent company commitment on the relationship between expatriate control strategies and job satisfaction of HCNs working with the expatriate managers. Previous research on international staffing has made an implicit assumption that expatriate managers have already internalized the parent firm's beliefs and values before they are sent abroad and can help to make sure the subsidiaries behave consistently with the parent firm's strategic goals (e.g., Gong, 2003; Kobrin, 1988). However, this assumption might not be accurate depending on the type of control mechanisms that MNCs use to control their expatriate managers due to the possible existence of agency problems between the headquarter and foreign subsidiaries.

According to Roth and Donnell (1996), expatriate managers' job discretion resulting from lateral centralization of MNCs, which refers to a condition where foreign subsidiary has worldwide responsibility for a complete set of value-adding activities associated with a specific product or product line, and expatriate parent commitment resulting from identification with headquarters affect the degree of agency problem between the headquarters and foreign

² Since output control assumes that it is feasible to measure the performance that is desired (Ouchi, 1977).

subsidiaries. Expatriate parent commitment minimizes the goal incongruence between the headquarter-foreign subsidiary relationships while job discretion increases the information asymmetry. From an organizational control perspective, job discretion and expatriate parent company commitment can also be considered as the formal and informal control mechanisms utilized by MNCs to decrease agency problems. We contend that job discretion and parent company commitment will moderate the relationship between expatriate control mechanisms and job satisfaction of host country nationals (in our case, HCN functional managers). Thus, by examining the contingent effects of formal and informal control of expatriate managers, we are able to provide a multilevel study to investigate the MNCs control of subsidiaries. Figure 1 illustrates our theoretical framework.

Insert Figure 1 about here

Control mechanisms used by expatriate managers and job satisfaction of HCN

Planning, as one of core control mechanisms, refers to “goal setting and standard establishment in each key functional area for which the individual or the work unit is held responsible” (Flamholtz et al., 1985: 39). It involves the setting of appropriate work goals and effective allocation of resources for each key functional area. It includes systems and processes like goal setting, strategic planning, budgeting, and establishment of schedules that tend to guide and channel the activities and actions of independent units (Martinez & Jarillo, 1989). It is thus considered an input control in our study, given its characteristics as an ex ante form of control (Flamholtz et al., 1985) and its regulation of antecedent conditions of performance (Cardinal, 2001). This is also consistent with directive leadership style with its conceptual roots in Theory X (McGregor, 1960), initiating structure from Ohio State studies (Fleishman, 1953; see meta-

analysis by Judge, Piccolo, & Ilies, 2004), and task oriented behavior from Michigan studies (e.g., Bass, 1967; Katz, Maccoby, & Morse, 1950) where representative leader behavior include issuing instructions and commands, and assigning goals.

According to Flamholtz et al. (1985), planning influences work behavior and attitudes through the setting of specific goals and the establishment of standards. Specifically, it provides the information necessary to direct or guide individual actions, and thus promotes goal congruence between the individual and the organization, which is essential for individual growth and satisfaction. Research on job satisfaction has shown that the less confusion about responsibilities that employees experience in completing work tasks, the more satisfied they will be with their jobs (e.g., Glisson & Durick, 1988). Thus, an expatriate manager can influence HCN functional managers' attitudes by setting clear goals and providing clear guidance in an appropriate manner. In addition, as one type of input control, planning is also related to the resource allocation of specific tasks, which will provide antecedent conditions of performance (Cardinal, 2001). As a way of supporting the work of HCN functional managers, the appropriate allocation of resources among different tasks by expatriate general managers provide HCN functional managers with necessary resources to complete their tasks and thus increase their work efficiency, which in turn will increase their job satisfaction. Thus, we contend that the use of planning by the expatriate managers is expected to enhance the HCN functional managers' job satisfaction by providing high goal clarity and congruence and support of resources.

Hypothesis 1a. Planning, as one type of input control mechanisms, is positively related to host country national manager's overall job satisfaction.

Process or behavioral control is based on direct personal surveillance, including watching and guiding employee activities and behaviors and regulating how work gets done (Cardinal, 2001; Eisenhardt, 1985; Ouchi, 1977). It is exercised when firms attempt to influence the means

to achieve desired objectives (Ouchi, 1977). Behavior control can be either activity control or capability control (Challagalla & Shervani, 1996). Activity control refers to the specification of the activities a person is expected to perform on a regular basis, the monitoring of actual behavior, and the administering of rewards or punishments and so on. While capability control emphasizes the development of individual skills and abilities, which involves encouraging, supporting, and reinforcing behaviors aimed at enhancing the skills and abilities. Given our top management of foreign subsidiary context where top managers' tasks are less programmable, we focus on capability control in the present study. By putting an emphasis on improving competence through better skills and abilities, capability control "is likely to satisfy a person's innate psychological need for competence and increase intrinsic motivation" (Challagalla & Shervani, 1996: 91).

When consulting with HCN managers, expatriate general managers seek their participation in decision making activities (cf. Falbe & Yukl, 1992). Expatriate managers are willing to modify a proposal or a plan to address their concerns and suggestions, including suggestions for more efficient processes to complete work. Consultation by expatriate managers during the work provides HCN functional managers with a sense of ownership and increases their commitment (cf. Falbe & Yukl, 1992). Consultation behavior by the expatriate manager will also give HCN functional managers a sense of autonomy since it makes them feel valued and respected, which is an important antecedent of employee job satisfaction (Loher & Noe, 1985). During the regulating process of how the work eventually gets done, expatriate managers using consulting as one type of behavior control mechanism to the HCN functional managers and win more commitment from them in return.

This is also in line with supportive leadership style with its conceptual roots in Theory Y (McGregor, 1960), consideration from Ohio State University studies (Fleishman, 1953; see meta-analysis by Judge et al., 2004), and relationship-oriented behavior from University of Michigan studies (e.g., Katz et al., 1950) where representative leader behavior include showing concern and respect for followers, looking out for their welfare, and expressing appreciation and support (Bass, 1985). “Leaders with this style are likely to have relationships with subordinates characterized by mutual trust, and they demonstrate respect for employees’ ideas and feelings” (Steers, Porter, & Bigley, 1996: 168). Therefore, we expect the following:

Hypothesis 1b. Consulting, as one type of process control mechanisms, is positively related to host country national manager’s overall job satisfaction.

Cross-level moderating effects of MNC’s formal and informal control of expatriates

To align the goals of expatriates with those of MNCs, the parent firms have to use both informal and formal control on expatriates. Previous research has shown that formal and informal and formal control mechanisms by MNCs are not mutually exclusive but can meaningfully co-exist. Consistent with contingency theory, the impacts of expatriate managers’ control mechanisms on functional managers’ job satisfaction are argued to be contingent on the extent to which expatriates are controlled by MNCs, formally and informally.

Expatriate job discretion can be viewed as the hierarchical or bureaucratic control determined by the MNC, which results from subsidiary autonomy (O’Donnell, 2000). The subsidiary is controlled through the imposition of an appropriate structural context that induces managers in the subsidiary to behave in desirable ways. Agency problems resulting from the information asymmetry between the principal and agent makes monitoring more difficult (Fama & Jensen, 1983). There is always tension between the delegation and the potential problems facing MNC headquarters (Baliga & Jaeger, 1984). Increased discretion should diminish the

effectiveness of monitoring of agency behavior (O'Donnell, 2000), because job discretion increases the latitude of options available to expatriate managers (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). Expatriate managers with high job discretion may engage in certain kinds of activities that are not optimal according to the parent MNC's interests, such as engaging in contracts that are not consistent with the MNC's goals.

Informal control or cultural control is frequently used by large organizations (Baliga & Jaeger, 1984), such as Ouchi's (1978, 1979) Type Z organizations with clan control. This type of control is more implicit rather than explicit. According to Baliga and Jaeger (1984: 27), it generates a "system of symbols, language, ideology, rituals, images, and myths that shapes the behavior of individuals and groups in the organization," and results in the development of moral commitment of employees through a process of socialization and indoctrination. As time goes by, researchers have paid more attention on the subtle and informal mechanisms used by MNCs (Martinez & Jarillo, 1989).

Parent company commitment, which refers to the psychological identification of expatriate managers with MNC headquarters, is very important in determining the extent of agency problem that may exist within MNCs and foreign subsidiaries (Roth & O'Donnell, 1996: 682). It is an application of control through socialization (Roth & O'Donnell, 1996) where a relatively complete socialization process eliminates goal incongruence between individuals and the organization (Ouchi, 1979). As a result, expatriates with a high level of parent company commitment are more likely to identify with and share the values of MNC headquarters. As pointed out by Ashforth and Mael (1989), identification leads to internalization of and adherence to firm values and to cooperative behavior. Thus, the potential agency problem resulting from

goal incongruence between headquarters and expatriates decreases when there is a high level of socialization (Ouchi, 1979; Roth & O'Donnell, 1996).

Moderating effects of formal and informal control of expatriates on input control.

While the MNC headquarter can reduce agency problem of expatriate managers by utilizing different formal and informal control mechanisms, the behaviors exhibited by the expatriate managers are bound to have an impact on the HCN functional managers' job attitudes.

Furthermore, according to attribution theory (Kelley, 1973), HCN functional managers are likely to make attributions regarding expatriate managers' behaviors as internal (originating from the actor) or external (originating from the external environment: cf. Martinko & Douglas, 1999).

Research on attribution theory suggests that internal and external attributions have an important impact on subsequent attitudes and behaviors (Kelley, 1973). On the one hand, when expatriate managers possess high job discretion, HCN managers are more likely to attribute their behaviors to internal causes (i.e., expatriate managers). Similarly, HCN managers are more likely to attribute expatriate managers' behavior to internal causes when they possess high parent company commitment. On the other hand, HCN managers are more likely to attribute their behaviors to external causes when expatriate managers possess low job discretion or low parent company commitment. In other words, HCN managers interpret their behaviors are being forced upon or required by the parent company.

Thus, while planning behavior should have a positive influence on HCN functional managers' job satisfaction through role and goal clarification (Hypothesis 1), we also expect that HCN functional managers' interpretation has a bearing on the impact of expatriate manager's behavior. This emphasis is based on social information processing research which shows that characteristics of the work context, the work itself, and work relationships "are not given but

constructed” (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978: 227). A large body of research argues and demonstrates that social-psychological processes influence the ways individuals create and construe their work environments (e.g., Thomas & Griffin, 1983).

For example, while planning influences work behavior and attitudes through the setting of specific goals and the establishment of standards, HCN functional manager can interpret expatriate manager’s behavior as enforced by the parent company (i.e., externally oriented). When this occurs, HCN functional managers may interpret expatriate manager’s behavior in a more negative light as neglecting the potential interests of foreign subsidiaries and its HCN constituents. Under this situation, the clear direction from expatriate managers on strategic goals and resource allocations during input control might cause the conflict of interests and role ambiguity for HCN functional managers. The negative emotions may surface out. Also, expatriates at the corporate level are less likely to have deep understanding of the local business environment. This type of input control may make HCN functional managers feel deprived of decision-making authority at the subsidiary-level, which also decreases their job satisfaction. However, HCN managers’ reaction are likely to be more positive when expatriate manager possess high amount of job discretion, i.e., HCN managers are likely to attribute their behavior to more internal causes such as expatriate manager being more (genuinely) interested in reducing uncertainty for HCN functional managers. In a similar vein, HCN managers are more likely to interpret expatriate manager’s behavior as internally caused when expatriate managers’ exhibit high parent company commitment (i.e., they have internalized the values and is willing to share it with HCN functional managers). Thus, HCN managers are more likely to make internal attribution regarding the planning behavior expatriate manager exhibits. Thus, we predict.

Hypothesis 2a. The amount of job discretion afforded to expatriate managers moderates the relationship between input control and HCN managers’ overall job satisfaction such

that the positive relationship between planning behavior and HCN managers' overall job satisfaction is stronger when expatriate managers possess higher amount of job discretion.

Hypothesis 2b. Expatriate managers' commitment to the parent company moderates the relationship between input control and HCN managers' overall job satisfaction such that the positive relationship between planning behavior and HCN managers' overall job satisfaction is stronger when expatriate managers possess higher amount of parent company commitment.

Moderating effects of formal and informal control of expatriates on behavior control.

When process control mechanisms are provided, there is increased communication with the expatriate manager and HCN functional managers. When the expatriate manager with higher amount of job discretion and higher commitment utilizes this “softer” form of control (i.e., capability-based process control mechanisms), they are more likely to behave in the interests of parent firms and thus inject values of the parent firms to the HCN functional managers through frequently interacting with them.

Through capability-based process control, expatriates with higher commitment and higher job discretion not only empower HCN functional managers and improve their skills and competence during the working process, but also show them a clearer picture of parent firms' strategic goals and expectations that are interpreted by HCN managers to be more sincere (i.e., internally cause). As such, HCN functional managers are more likely to understand the motivations behind expatriate managers' “controlling” behaviors, and may finally accept and identify with the parent firms' values themselves. (It is also more likely that HCN functional managers will not interpret expatriate manager's behavior as “controlling”). This result will influence their interpretations of the expatriate managers' control mechanisms (i.e., leadership behaviors) more positively and their intrinsic motivations are likely to increase, resulting in a greater increase in their overall job satisfaction. Therefore, the impact of expatriate managers'

control mechanisms on HCN functional managers will increase when HCN functional managers interpret social cues provided by the expatriate manager as more internally caused. Thus, we expect the following:

Hypothesis 3a. The amount of job discretion afforded to expatriate managers moderates the relationship between input control and HCN managers' overall job satisfaction such that the positive relationship between consulting behavior and HCN managers' overall job satisfaction is stronger when expatriate managers possess higher amount of job discretion.

Hypothesis 3b. Expatriate managers' commitment to the parent company moderates the relationship between input control and HCN managers' overall job satisfaction such that the positive relationship between planning behavior and HCN managers' overall job satisfaction is stronger when expatriate managers possess higher amount of parent company commitment.

METHODS

Research Design

As part of a larger research effort, an initial list of sixty-two multinational hotel management firms who were involved with four or more properties outside of its home country was identified from the 1998 American Hotel and Motel Association Directory. Contact was established with senior-level executives at forty-four of these firms and each received a verbal (telephone) and written (via fax) description of the research project. This initial contact revealed that twelve firms did not manage properties, four companies did not use expatriate managers, and one company was not interested, resulting in twenty-five potential firms for the study. After several follow-up calls to corporate executives, eighteen indicated their inability or unwillingness to participate, resulting in nine firms that agreed to participate in the study.

To reduce common method bias, we obtained survey data from expatriate managers as well as HCN subordinates (i.e., functional managers). Furthermore, to reduce position or job-type variance, we selected expatriates holding the general manager (GM) position. Similarly, we

selected HCN “subordinates” who were members of the hotel’s executive committee, holding one of four specific positions (Controller, Front Office Manager, Marketing Director, and Human Resources Manager) at the host location. Individuals holding these positions were quite familiar with the expatriate GMs’ work, had regular and frequent opportunities to interact with them, and thereby deemed well-suited to be included in the study.

Senior level contacts at the MNC headquarters of each of the nine firms identified expatriate GMs working for the firm and provided their names and the address of each expatriate’s corresponding hotel. Each GM was assigned a four digit number (i.e., 1032) that was printed on his/her survey and recorded before the survey was mailed. Each general manager’s status as an expatriate was verified by matching the hotel’s location with the general manager’s response to a single item asking them to indicate his/her nationality. We did not, however, ask corporate contacts for details regarding the names of expatriate versus local national status of the top management team to maintain anonymity. Instead, we simply addressed four envelopes with the following titles printed on them: “Front Office Manager”, “Human Resources Manager”, “Sales and Marketing Manager”, and “Controller” and included these envelopes in the package mailed directly to the expatriate GMs.

Eight items were included in the package mailed to each expatriate general manager: first was a letter from the senior corporate contact encouraging participation in the study and assuring that individual responses would remain confidential. Second were explicit instructions for the expatriate manager regarding the completion of their own survey and distribution of surveys to their executive management team. Third was the coded expatriate general manager survey. Fourth was an optional fax response form. This allowed respondents to avoid the possibility of their responses being lost in the mail and reduced the turnaround time for gathering data. The

remaining items included four sealed envelopes individually addressed to the four specific functional level managers (i.e., controller, front office manager, human resources manager, and marketing manager). Inside each of these subordinate envelopes was a similar letter from the corporate executive contact, the functional level manager instrument (subordinate survey), and an optional fax response form, similar to that of the expatriate GMs. The surveys for subordinates used the same code number as the corresponding expatriate GM was assigned, but included an additional number. For example, expatriate general manager 1032's subordinates' surveys were coded: 1032-1, 1032-2, 1032-3, and 1032-4. The numbers 1-4 after the dash represented the specific position held by subordinates (i.e., -1 = Financial Controller, -2 = Human Resource Manager, -3 = Sales & Marketing Manager, and -4 = Front Office Manager). One of the items on the subordinate instrument asked respondents to indicate their nationality. Responses to this item were used to identify which subordinates were indeed local nationals by matching the response to the hotel's location.

Sample

Surveys were sent directly from the researchers to 310 expatriate GMs. As discussed above, expatriate GMs' packages included subordinate surveys and instructions for the GM to distribute these surveys to the individuals holding the specified position addressed on each envelope. Therefore, expatriate GMs were instructed to deliver four surveys at their hotel, for a total of 1240 total surveys distributed to subordinates across all hotel properties. Two hundred twenty-four expatriate GMs and 666 subordinates returned completed surveys, representing a response rate of 72 percent for the expatriate group and 54 percent for the subordinate group, both of which exceed rates typically found in expatriate studies (e.g., Black & Stephens, 1989). From this dataset, we constructed a matched sample in which each case consisted of data from

one expatriate GM and at least one matched HCN subordinate. The matched sample included data from 139 expatriate hotel GMs (62% of returned expatriate surveys) and 324 HCN subordinates (49% of returned subordinate surveys). HCN subordinate respondents per expatriate GM ranged from 1 to 4, with a mean of 2.3.

Of the 139 expatriate GMs, 132 were male and 7 female, with an average age of 46, an average tenure of 13 years in the parent organization, and 3.65 years in the foreign subsidiary. Expatriate managers came from 29 different countries, with Australia (11), France (16), Germany (15), United Kingdom (19), and the United States of America (21), as an example. Of the 324 HCN subordinates, 187 were male and 137 female, with an average tenure of 7 years in their current organization and an average age of 38. HCN subordinates (also the host country of the expatriate assignment) represented 66 countries, including those from Australia (20), China (12), Germany (11), Indonesia (27), Malaysia (33), Mexico (11), Philippines (21), Singapore (12), and Thailand (22), to name a few.

Measures

Parent company commitment (expatriate manager-level). We used the four-item scales by Gregersen and Black (1992) to measure expatriate general managers' affective commitment toward the parent company. Gregersen and Black (1992) originally adapted two items from Organizational Commitment Questionnaire (Mowday, Steers, & Porter, 1979) and another two items from O'Reilly and Chatman's (1986) commitment scales to tap into commitment of expatriates. A sample item for parent company commitment is: "I really care about the fate of my parent company." A five-point Likert-type scale with 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) was used. The reliability of this scale was .83.

Job discretion (expatriate manager-level). The extent to which expatriate managers were afforded job discretion at the foreign subsidiary was measured by three items taken from Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989). These items asked about the expatriate managers' discretion with regard to decisions about introduction of new services or products, for example, at the local subsidiary (i.e., hotel). A sample item asks the GMs to assess their influence on decisions about the introduction of new services or products from 1 ("headquarters decides alone") to 5 ("individual hotel decides alone"). The reliability of this scale was .74.

Control mechanisms used by the expatriate managers (HCN-level). The types of control mechanisms used by an expatriate general manager on a host country national were evaluated from host country national manager's perspective. We used a proxy – six-item planning behavior scale from the Managerial Practice Survey by Yukl (1990, 1994) to measure input control. The Planning behavior scale contains items that emphasize resource allocation aspects of input control (e.g., "Determines priorities for different activities and plans an appropriate allocation of available resources among the activities"). The Six-item planning scale had a reliability of .86. For process/behavior control, the five-item Consulting behavior scale from Yukl (1990, 1994) was used. This scale captures the regulating aspects of behavior/process control noted by Cardinal (2001). A sample item states, "Modifies his/her proposals or plans to deal with my concerns and incorporate my suggestions." This scale had a reliability of .89.

Host country national manager overall job satisfaction (HCN-level). The nine selected items from Minnesota Satisfaction Questionnaire (Weiss, Dawis, England, & Lofquist, 1967) was used to assess HCN managers' overall job satisfaction. This scale is comprised of selected items from the Example items state, "In general, I am satisfied with my job," and "I am satisfied with the variety of activities my job offers." Given that we are interested in the overall level of

HCN managers' job satisfaction, we averaged all nine items to create an overall job satisfaction score. This scale had a reliability of .80.

Control variables. To examine the robustness of the findings, we included a variety of controls that may potentially have an impact on the variables of interest. First, to examine whether or not certain multinational hotel chains' treatment of its host country national employees substantively differ, which may be reflected in HCNs overall job satisfaction levels, we included eight dummy coded variables each representing a particular multinational hotel chain. In addition, it may be possible that HCN functional managers possessing more favorable attitude toward the expatriate GM may be more likely to respond to the questionnaire, we included dummy coded (single vs. multiple) respondent variable to capture this potential. Also, foreign subsidiary size could reduce the amount of job satisfaction by the HCN functional managers. We include the number of employees that are employed by the hotel to represent this Cardinal (2001). The use of this variable as a control is relatively common in the hospitality research (e.g., Ingram & Roberts, 2000). Finally, we included five demographic variables associated with HCN functional managers, including their age, gender, education level, organizational tenure, and the number of expatriate GM HCN functional managers had worked for in his/her career.

Analytic procedure

Recall that the first hypothesis considers the host country national- (or individual-) level relationship between individualized control mechanisms used by the expatriate managers on a particular host country national manager and his/her overall job satisfaction, whereas the remaining hypotheses (Hypotheses 2 & 3) involve cross-level moderating effect between constructs residing at the expatriate manager (or foreign subsidiary) and host country nationals

(or individual) levels of analysis. Following Bliese's (2002) recommendations, the hypotheses involving cross-level moderating effects were tested using Random Coefficient Model (RCM; also termed hierarchical linear modeling) analyses with Version 3.0 of the Nonlinear and Linear Mixed Effects (NLME) program for S-PLUS and R (Pinheiro & Bates, 2000). Unlike regression analyses, RCM appropriately partitions HCN outcomes into within-expatriate general manager and between-expatriate general manager variance, and then regresses the within-expatriate general manager variance on HCN predictors (i.e., three control mechanisms), and the between-expatriate variance on expatriate-level predictors (expatriate job discretion and parent company commitment). In RCM tests, we report the unstandardized parameter estimates, standard errors, and their statistical significance, as well as the variance explained for by both Level 1 (HCN-level) and Level 2 (expatriate general manager-level) predictors (see Bliese, 2002). Note, however, that the variance explained estimates are "Pseudo R^2 " values that can be unstable, and either under- or over-estimate the true effect sizes (Snijders & Bosker, 1999). Therefore, we also report the total R^2 value for each model, obtained from cross-level operator tests in regression (James & Williams, 2000), reflecting the total variance of the dependent variable explained by the models.

RESULTS

Table 1 shows the means, standard deviations, and correlations among the variables of interest. Reliabilities for each scale are listed in the diagonal where appropriate. Unstandardized means and standard deviations for expatriate job discretion, expatriate parent company commitment, and HCN manager rated control mechanisms used by expatriate general managers are listed for informational purposes only because we applied z-score transformation to standardize these variables before running the RCM analyses.

Insert Table 1 about here

For Hypotheses 1a and 1b, which proposed a positive relationship between expatriate managers' use of control mechanisms and HCN managers' overall job satisfaction, the second column in Table 2 shows the results. Specifically, the results reveal that planning behavior as a form of input control exerted by the expatriate manager was significantly related to HCN managers' overall job satisfaction (.145, $p < .01$), which provides support for Hypothesis 1a. Also, consulting behavior as a form of capability-based process/behavioral control was significantly, positively related to HCN managers' overall job satisfaction (.398, $p < .001$). This result provides support for Hypothesis 1b. As a supplementary analysis to check the robustness of these results, Table 3 provides the analysis with 15 control variables. The results shown in column 3 also provide consistent support for both Hypothesis 1a and 1b in that planning and consulting behaviors were positively related to HCN managers' overall job satisfaction (.145, $p < .05$ & .387, $p < .001$).

Insert Table 2 about here

For Hypotheses 2a and 2b, which proposed the moderating effect of a MNC's formal and informal control mechanism (i.e., job discretion and expatriate manager commitment to the parent MNC) on the relationship between expatriate managers' use of the input control and HCN managers' overall job satisfaction, the third column in Table 2 illustrates the results. In particular, the results show that the interaction term between planning behavior and expatriate job discretion was significant and positive (.125, $p < .05$) on HCN managers' overall job satisfaction. Using the procedure recommended by Aiken and West (1991), we plotted this interaction effect in Figure 2a. This figure shows that there was a positive relationship between planning behavior and HCN

managers' overall job satisfaction when expatriate managers possessed high amount of job discretion while this relationship became flatter when expatriate managers did not. Thus, the findings provide support for Hypotheses 2a. The results also depict that the interaction term between planning behavior and expatriate manager parent company commitment was not significantly related to HCN managers' overall job satisfaction, which does not provide support for Hypothesis 2b. These results were highly comparable even when control variables were included in the analysis (see fourth column in Table 3).

Insert Figure 2 about here

Hypotheses 3a and 3b proposed the moderating effect of a MNC's formal and informal control mechanisms (i.e., expatriate job discretion and expatriate manager commitment to the parent MNC) on the relationship between the capability-based behavior control mechanisms used by the expatriate managers and HCN managers' overall job satisfaction. Again, the third column in Table 2 shows the results. More specifically, the interaction term between consulting behavior and job discretion was only marginally, significantly related ($-.102, p < .10$) to HCN managers' overall job satisfaction. This does not provide support for Hypothesis 3a that proposed the moderating effect of job discretion on the relationship between consulting behavior and HCN manager overall job satisfaction. On the other hand, the interaction term between consulting behavior and parent company commitment was significant and positive ($.137, p < .05$). When plotted, Figure 3 reveals that the relationship between consulting behavior and HCN managers' overall job satisfaction became stronger under high expatriate parent company commitment. Combined, these results offer empirical support for Hypothesis 3b. Again, the results were essentially the same even when a set of control variables were included (see column 4, Table 3).

Insert Figure 3 about here

DISCUSSION

One of the main objectives of this study was to explicate the roles of different control mechanisms used by the MNCs and its agents, expatriate managers, have on HCN managers' attitudes, namely overall job satisfaction. In this study, we developed hypotheses relating three different control mechanisms used by the expatriate managers and two controls used by the MNC headquarters on HCNs through an integration of organizational control literature with multilevel theoretical perspective. We found a significant relationship between input control mechanism (i.e., planning behavior) of expatriate managers on HCN managers' job satisfaction and capability-based process (i.e., consulting) control mechanism of expatriate managers on HCN managers' job satisfaction. This is perhaps one of the first studies to conceptualize expatriate managers' (leadership) behaviors from a control theory perspective and to illustrate the positive influence of different types of control mechanisms on HCNs' attitudes. Given that one of the major purposes of sending expatriates to foreign subsidiaries is to control the attitudes and behavior of employees on site (i.e., host country nationals), this study contributes to the MNC literature by illustrating the relationship between expatriate managers' use of different control mechanisms on HCNs' attitudes. Although this relationship is implied in much of MNC control literature (e.g., Baliga & Jaeger, 1984; Boyacigiller, 1990; Gong, 2003), this study is the first one to explicitly conceptualize and test these relationships. In addition, this study also contributes to expatriate literature by showing the impact of expatriate managers on HCNs, which has been a neglected aspect of expatriate experience literature (Toh & DeNisi, 2003).

We also differentiated the control mechanisms used by the expatriate managers as agents of MNCs and MNCs use of (informal and formal) control mechanisms on expatriate managers

(i.e., parent company commitment and job discretion). While one could argue that the amount of parent company commitment that expatriate managers have may not easily be assessable and parent company headquarters might not have intended to select expatriate managers who are (more or less) committed, the fact of the matter is that the selected expatriate managers on international assignment do differ in their commitment to the parent company, which does impact HCNs. More specifically, we found that parent company commitment and job discretion acted as moderators of the relationship between the control mechanisms used by the expatriate managers and HCN managers' overall job satisfaction. Given that these HCN functional managers comprises the top management team at the local hotel (i.e., foreign subsidiary), this has significant implications for the entire subsidiary.

This study also points out the importance of balance between informal and formal control in the organization. As noted by Cardinal et al. (2004), during the evolution of organizational control, it is very important to keep the balance between the use of informal and formal control. Our findings illustrate the need for additional research that elucidates the complicated means through which different types of control mechanisms affect the expatriate managers and HCNs. We believe that this study is the first step toward such understanding. Future research should extend this line of work and examine the impact of different types of controls MNC use on expatriate managers' attitudes and behaviors as well as how this may indirectly shape the attitudes and behaviors of HNCs. Another future research direction is to examine the differential impact of control mechanisms depending on the evolutionary stages of foreign subsidiaries (Muralidharan & Hamilton, 1999). In other words, it may be the case that different control mechanisms are more effective at different stages of foreign subsidiary development.

Limitations

The interpretation of the current findings should be considered in light of the limitations associated with this study. First and foremost, although using questionnaires to collect variables of interest enabled us to delve into issues that have been neglected, it also created a limitation due to the cross-sectional nature of the dataset. More specifically, current data structure does not allow any causal inferences regarding the relationships being tested in this study. The causal directions implied in Figure 1 are based on multilevel theorizing (top down effect) and prior research on organizational control. Thus, we encourage future studies to collect longitudinal data from both expatriates and host country nationals. Although such data collection effort will be difficult, it will be worthwhile to do so.

Second, findings from this study may not generalize beyond the hotel industry (or other global service industries). While our research design controlled for the potential confounding effects of industry and job position, the moderating effect of expatriate managers' parent company commitment on the relationship between control mechanisms used and their overall job satisfaction may be different in multidomestic industries. It may be the case that foreign subsidiary commitment may become a more important factor for expatriates in multidomestic industries to be effective, for example. Similarly, the generalizability of our findings may be limited to expatriate managers and HCN subordinates who hold positions at higher organizational levels. Future research, therefore, is needed to replicate and extend the generalizability of the present results.

Third, there are many additional variables that can influence the amount of HCNs' overall job satisfaction, including but are not limited to human resource management practices (Koys, 2001), leadership styles, and personality traits and individual differences (such as emotional stability, self-esteem, locus of control, and generalized self-efficacy), to name a few.

While our intention was to illustrate the different mechanisms through which MNCs can exert controls on HCN managers (where job satisfaction is used as an exemplar of job attitudes), future studies can investigate the incremental validity of these control mechanisms over and above other more traditional predictors of job satisfaction.

Finally, our primary intent was to extend MNC control literature by examining the influence of input and behavior control mechanisms utilized by the expatriate managers on host country national managers simultaneously. Thus, rather than examining a host of job attitudes that may be related to the use of control mechanisms, we focused on job satisfaction, which arguably is one of the most important job attitudes that have been studied most extensively to date (cf. Locke, 1976). Therefore, a replication and an extension of the current study should include other job attitudes as well.

CONCLUSION

These limitations aside, there are substantial strengths associated with the current study. First and foremost, we obtained responses from multiple HCN subordinates, a source of data not typically utilized in either international strategy or expatriate research (Toh & DeNisi, 2003). Second, based on our review of the literature, this is the first study to examine the cross-level moderating effects of expatriate control mechanisms used by the MNCs on the HCN control mechanisms – their job satisfaction relationship. We hope that the current research stimulates further interest in MNC control literature using a multilevel theoretical lens.

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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics, Reliability Coefficients, and Correlations

VARIABLES		M	SD	1	2	3	4	5
1.	Expatriate job discretion ^a	3.60	0.89	(.91)				
2.	Expatriate parent company commitment ^a	4.12	0.66	-.01	(.83)			
3.	Planning behavior	4.08	0.83	.03	.07	(.86)		
4.	Consulting behavior	4.14	0.78	.08	.03	.53***	(.89)	
5.	HCN manager overall job satisfaction	3.81	0.55	.08	.14***	.37***	.48***	(.80)

Note. *N*= 324 host country nationals with 139 expatriate general managers; internal consistency reliability coefficients (alphas) appear on the diagonal. * $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$ (two-tailed); ^a Establishment-level and expatriate manager means assigned down to individual HCN managers.

Table 2. Analysis Results on Host Country National Manager Overall Job Satisfaction

Variables	HCN Manager Overall Job Satisfaction					
<i>Level 2 Variables</i>						
Expatriate decision making autonomy	.110*	(.030)	.038	(.027)	.033	(.027)
Expatriate parent company commitment	.146**	(.030)	.121**	(.026)	.124**	(.026)
<i>Level 1 Variables</i>						
Planning behaviors			.145**	(.031)	.157**	(.031)
Consulting behaviors			.398***	(.031)	.397***	(.031)
<i>Cross-Level Moderating Effects</i>						
Expatriate decision making autonomy x planning behaviors					.125*	(.029)
Expatriate decision making autonomy x consulting behaviors					-.089	(.035)
Expatriate parent company commitment x planning behaviors					-.099 ⁺	(.028)
Expatriate parent company commitment x consulting behaviors					.155**	(.030)
R^2_{L1} (df = 179, 324/ 171, 324)						
R^2_{L2}						
R^2 (ΔR^2)	.032**		.267	(.235***)	.295	(.028*)

Note. $N = 324$ host country nationals nested in 139 expatriate general managers in 139 establishments; * $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$ (two-tailed); Standard errors are reported inside (); R^2_{L1} = within-establishment variance accounted for by Level 1 predictors; R^2_{L2} = between-establishment variance accounted for by Level 2 predictors.

Table 3. Supplementary Analysis with Controls

Variables	Host Country National Overall Job Satisfaction			
<i>Level 2 Variables</i>				
Dummy coded company 1	-.184 ⁺ (.149)	-.188 ⁺ (.160)	-.172 ⁺ (.141)	-.174 ⁺ (.141)
Dummy coded company 2	.014 (.134)	-.009 (.138)	-.079 (.121)	-.067 (.121)
Dummy coded company 3	-.035 (.297)	-.029 (.306)	-.024 (.270)	-.030 (.269)
Dummy coded company 4	-.125 ⁺ (.206)	-.115 (.216)	-.084 (.190)	-.073 (.192)
Dummy coded company 5	.036 (.162)	.041 (.161)	-.014 (.142)	-.020 (.142)
Dummy coded company 6	-.129 (.158)	-.107 (.160)	-.121 (.141)	-.112 (.140)
Dummy coded company 7	-.006 (.221)	-.007 (.221)	.034 (.195)	.042 (.195)
Dummy coded company 8	-.100 (.155)	-.115 (.162)	-.142 ⁺ (.142)	-.118 (.143)
Dummy coded respondent (single vs. multiple)	.069 (.085)	.075 (.084)	.051 (.074)	.052 (.074)
Foreign subsidiary size (# of employees)	-.106 ⁺ (.000)	-.095 (.000)	-.094 ⁺ (.000)	-.100 ⁺ (.000)
HCN age	.147* (.005)	.143* (.005)	.146** (.004)	.123* (.004)
HCN gender	-.019 (.065)	-.018 (.065)	-.040 (.057)	-.045 (.056)
HCN education level	-.050 (.021)	-.049 (.021)	-.031 (.018)	-.027 (.018)
HCN organizational tenure	-.102 (.006)	-.099 (.006)	-.110* (.005)	-.103 ⁺ (.005)
HCN expatriate GM worked for in career	.023 (.009)	.012 (.009)	.043 (.008)	.034 (.008)
Expatriate job discretion		.131* (.033)	.053 (.029)	.047 (.029)
Expatriate parent company commitment		.058 (.035)	.059 (.031)	.065 (.031)
<i>Level 1 Variables</i>				
Planning behaviors			.145* (.032)	.154** (.032)
Consulting behaviors			.387*** (.032)	.387*** (.032)
<i>Cross-Level Moderating Effects</i>				
Expatriate decision making autonomy x planning behaviors				.118* (.030)
Expatriate decision making autonomy x consulting behaviors				-.065 (.037)
Expatriate parent company commitment x planning behaviors				-.102 ⁺ (.030)
Expatriate parent company commitment x consulting behaviors				.137* (.030)
R ² _{LI} (df= 179, 324/ 171, 324)				
R ² (ΔR ²)	.081*	.099 (.018 ⁺)	.310 (.211***)	.332 (.022*)

Figure 1: Cross-Level Model of MNC Control

Expatriate General Manager-Level

Host Country National-Level

Figure 2: Moderating Effects of Job Discretion on Planning Behavior – HCN Manager Overall Job Satisfaction Relationships

Figure 3: Moderating Effects of Parent Company Commitment on Consulting Behavior – HCN Manager Overall Job Satisfaction Relationships