Ritual Transformation—Xunzi’s Response to Mozi in the Lilun Pian

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Introduction

It is well known that Mozi (墨子) criticizes the ritual practices of the Ru (儒, the Confucian school) for being wasteful. However, another criticism has been less appreciated: These practices are merely conventional habituations and violate the Ru’s own moral ideals of ren 仁 (humanity), yi 義 (right, righteousness) and xiao 孝 (being filial). Xunzi (荀子) responds to both criticisms in the Li Lun Pian 礼 论篇 (“Discourse on Ritual Principles”). Based on an account of Mozi’s arguments and Xunzi’s replies, this essay discusses the significance of ritual transformation (礼义之化) in Xunzi’s moral philosophy.

Transformation (化)

Let us start by looking at analogies of transformation in the text of the Xunzi. The first chapter begins with the admonition that learning should never cease (学不可以已). Learning involves transformation as we see from the following analogies. Dye made from the indigo plant is bluer; ice comes from water but is colder; wood can be curved into a wheel; and metal can be sharpened. (K1.1, Li2).¹

These analogies imply the change of an original state with a certain potential to another state that manifests this potential in some form. With the exception of water
turning into ice under natural conditions, these changes do not occur of themselves. We see the need for effort in making the change, and this is all the more important when we think of what is involved in moral learning. The overall term that signifies this in Xunzi’s thinking is *wei* (僞). This refers to the making of something, requiring deliberation (慮) and cumulative effort (積). A central contrast of *wei* is with *sheng* (生) or what is given through “life” or “birth”. Thus, a transformative moral state is thought to be the result of human effort instead of a biological feature of birth.

When Xunzi speaks of transformation through ritual practices, he has in mind a positive moral state, and not merely feeling bound by external constraints. In this regard, an important term that occurs in conjunction with *hua* is *shen* (神). This appears to be a state of learning and moral achievement that enables someone to influence others silently. It also refers to the seemingly wondrous effect of this influence—even though the process is invisible, the effect comes through. Xunzi compares this to the following effects of natural phenomena: “The great transformations of *yin yang*, the bountiful scattering of wind and rain, each of the myriad things receiving what is agreeable to their growth, and each receiving what nurtures them to maturity (陰陽大化，風雨博施，萬物各得其和以生，各得其養以成).” Following this, he says: “Not perceiving the process we see the result, this is
called *shen* (不見其事，而見其功，夫是謂神).” (K17.2b, Li365)

Given this silent influence of *shen*, it would not be inappropriate to refer to it as a transformative moral force, and those who have been influenced as having undergone a process of *yang* or nurture (養) resulting in moral growth and maturity. This is confirmed by the association of *shen* with the moral qualities of sincerity and humanity. The gentleman’s nurture of a sincere heart-mind and his being humane will manifest itself in *shen*, a moral force that transforms others. (君子養心莫善於誠…誠心守仁則形，形則神，神則能化矣). (K3.9a, Li47) The same association between being humane and transforming others is found in the following statement: “Wherever the army of a humane man is, it has an effect like that of a *shen*; wherever it travels, it produces transformation. Like seasonable rains, it pleases and gives joy to all.” (故仁者之兵，所存者神，所過者化，若時雨之降，莫不說喜).² (K15.2, Li328)

For Xunzi, the sages have the ability to transform themselves through cumulative effort. And according to him, habitual practice can shift the will, and over time can even result in a change of substantial qualities of the person (習俗移志，安久移質). (K8.11, Li 154). Similarly, transformation occurs over the long-term such that the transformed object will never revert to its beginnings (長遷而不反其初，則化矣). (K3.9c, Li 47). As he says regarding the analogy of curving wood into a wheel, “It
will not return to its former straightness (不復挺者).” ³ (K1.1, Li2).

By “beginnings” in this context Xunzi is evidently referring to man’s nature or xing (性). Elsewhere, I have argued that in Xunzi’s philosophy, there is nothing in essence bad about human nature that prevents transformation. An appreciation of this involves understanding the contents not only of xing 性, but also of other general facts that Xunzi refers to as the qing of man (人之情). ⁴ Xing is a biological concept referring to what all persons are born with, namely, the basic sensory and appetitive desires. In addition, they are said to be born with a love of benefit, feelings of envy and hate, and pettiness. However, “the qing of man” refers to the fact that people also have wants and capacities that go beyond the basic desires and feelings. They want wealth, luxury, and a more refined life. These imply the need for security, the capacities to think long-term, to be prudent, and to establish or learn ritual principles.

The contents of xing are of course essential to biological life and survival. However, they are not an essence in the sense of being what is distinctive about man qua man. The biological “raw material” of man can be transformed because in addition, the qing of man is such that people possess the capacities mentioned. However, for various reasons, some people are not able to transform themselves because they do not exercise their capacities.⁵

Thus, the object of transformation is nature (化性) and the instrument of
transformation is the ritual principles (禮義) established and taught by the sages. It might be thought that they can only serve to curb the excesses of individual desires and to inculcate habits so as to establish and maintain a hierarchical social order. Although there is certainly this aspect of the rites in Xunzi’s discussion of the concept, the whole educational aim of the rites is transformative in the moral sense already described. We shall be in a better position to appreciate this after an analysis of Xunzi’s response to Mozi’s criticisms.

Mozi’s Economic Argument

In the Introduction, I referred to the well-known criticism of Mozi’s that the Ru ritual practices are wasteful. Let us call the argument supporting this criticism the “economic argument”. Mozi appealed to the authority of the ancient sage-kings who, according to him, acted by the law of economical use (節用之法). This means the production and consumption of food, clothing and shelter for simple utilitarian purposes. Food satiates hunger and maintains strength and health, while clothing provides warmth. Houses provide shelter against the elements. In addition, the rooms of houses are clean enough for sacrificial purposes and the partitions in the palace are high enough to separate the sexes. Anything beyond these basic purposes was, according to Mozi, useless expenditure (無用之費). The sage-kings were economical in their use of resources (用財不費), and this meant too not
exhausting the people unnecessarily. Artisans, carpenters, craftsmen, farmers, and other workers should therefore produce only what is necessary to satisfy the most basic desires and needs.

The aspect of Ruist ritual that Mozi is particularly critical of is its use of luxurious items that seem merely to gratify the senses. For instance, there are ceremonies that call for refined food accompanied by a variety of aesthetically pleasing utensils and decorum. Add to this the clothing, adornments, decorations, musical instruments and other paraphernalia associated with ritual performance—the refinements of Ruist ritual must have seemed very extravagant indeed. Appealing to the law of economical use, Mozi says: “There is no need of combining the five tastes extremely well or harmonizing the different sweet odours.”12 The sage-king Yao “ate out of an earthen liu (塯) and drank out of an earthen xing (形), and took wine out of a spoon. With the ceremonies of bowing and stretching and courtesies and decorum the sage-king had nothing to do.”13 In short, according to Mozi, any practice that is deemed useless (無用) and of no benefit (利) should be abolished.

Xunzi on Nurture or Yang (養)

Certain references to Mozi and his school in the Li Lun Pian indicate that Xunzi is responding to Mozi’s criticism. There are also passages that are a direct response to points made by Mozi, even though his name is not mentioned. In this section, we
see how Xunzi responds to Mozi’s economic argument through the concept of *yang* or nurture. In a single passage, Xunzi refers to various objects of nurture, and we shall analyze what “nurture” means in each case.

Xunzi first discusses the origin of the rites in terms of its providing the economic and social conditions for order. People are born with desires. Left unregulated, this will result in strife, disorder and poverty. The sage kings are said to have abhorred such chaos and therefore “established the ritual principles to make normative distinctions, to nurture people’s desires, and to supply what they seek (故制禮義以分之，以養人之欲，給人之求).” (K19.1a, Li417) That is, social chaos is prevented through *fen* 分, the normative distinctions established by the ritual principles. These distinctions govern relationships through norms that determine familial, social and professional status and the corresponding distribution of benefits and burdens, wealth and responsibilities. (See also K4.12, Li69)

At the same time, the ritual principles are said to nurture the desires of men (養人之欲). This seems to be explained by the economic function of ensuring that desires as a whole are not left wanting because of an inadequate supply of goods (欲不窮於物). In this sense, the notion of *yang* would appear to be a result of *fen*. That is, people’s desires and expectations would be moderated by the normative distinctions of their respective familial, social and professional status. This
moderation is implied by the converse of the statement that desires are not left wanting by an inadequate supply, namely, that supply is not exhausted by the desires (物必不屈於欲). (K19.1a, Li417)

It would seem natural therefore to expect that this is what Xunzi means when he next says, “Thus, ritual is nurture” (故禮者養也). That is, ritual “nurtures” in the sense that it both curbs and moderates people’s desires through the imposition of normative distinctions. However, the equation of ritual with nurture is followed by a list of refined food, flavors, fragrances, exquisite jewels, emblems, musical instruments, and bodily comforts. These items are said to nurture the various senses, namely, the mouth, nose, eyes, ear, and (the comforts of) the body (養：口，鼻，目，耳，體). He then repeats, “Thus, ritual is nurture.” (K19.1b, Li418) If this is to be taken in the single sense of curbing and moderating the desires, it is puzzling why Xunzi should provide a list of refined and luxurious items that would seem instead to satisfy (or gratify) the senses to the utmost extent.

But this is resolved if we see that Xunzi is not talking about nurturing the senses per se. Instead, his concern is with ritual, and there is evidently some link between the nurture of the senses and ritual. Note that the things that nurture the senses are refined items of ritual. When Xunzi both prefaces and ends his remarks about the nurture of the senses with the remark that ritual is nurture, he means to associate ritual
with cultivation and refinement. Thus, it would not be inappropriate to say that ritual is nurture in the sense of cultivated refinement. Elsewhere, for instance, Xunzi likens the ignorance of ritual principles to the coarse satisfaction of appetite, and in this regard the way of the tyrannical king Jie and Robber Zhi is contrasted with that of the Ancient Kings “just as the meat of pastured and grain-fed animals contrasts with dregs and husks.” (See K4.10, Li65). This means that to have knowledge of ritual principles is to be cultivated and refined.

Xunzi then says that the gentleman who has been nurtured (in the sense of cultivated refinement) also likes the distinctions (好其別) that this gives rise to. The emblems, regalia and comforts of the Son of Heaven do not just satisfy the body and the senses, but they serve to nurture a sense of: trust (養信), majestic authority (養威), and peace/security (養安). (19.1c, Li419) We may understand this to mean that the refinements of ritual involve distinctions that in this instance nurture a sense of trust in and respect for authority.

With regard to yang an 養安, Xunzi mentions that “the horse for the Grand Chariot must be thoroughly reliable and perfectly trained before it is harnessed, to nurture a sense of security around him.” While this seems to say something about the security that the ruler gains from having a reliable horse, it at the same time suggests the role of the rites in nurturing a sense of peace/security for the people. Shortly
after, for instance, the notion of *yang an* is repeated through the statement that the reverence and courtesy of ritual are means whereby peace/security is attained. (K19.1d, Li439).

Next, Xunzi says: “Who knows that (being prepared) to go forth to one’s death in the name of honor is to nurture life!” (孰知夫出死要節之所以養生也!) (K19.1d, Li419) Xunzi cannot mean by “life” here the mere maintenance of a biological and material life. The preparedness to die brings in another dimension of *sheng* 生 or “life”. The term *yao jie* 要節 in this context could refer either to the duty-bound “carrying out a commission” or to “value honor”. In either case, we can understand Xunzi to be saying that there is a significant understanding of “life” such that in order to nurture it, one is (paradoxically) prepared to die.

Xunzi goes on to ask: “Who knows that the (seemingly wasteful) expenditures nurture wealth!” (孰知夫出費用之所以養財也!). (K19.1c, Li419) This is a direct response to Mozi. Recall that Mozi had criticized the Ru for useless expenditure (無用之費) and contrasted this with the sage kings’ economical use of wealth or resources (用財不費). Clearly, Xunzi is denying that the use of luxurious and refined items in ritual constitute useless or wasteful expenditure.

Mozi seems to have thought of society’s economic state in terms of an individual’s consuming only basic necessities and limiting his desires to these.
Xunzi, however, realizes that the economic state of a society cannot be modeled upon an individual in this way. And neither should it be thought that people only have, or should be limited to, basic desires and needs. Instead, they have a wide range of desires, wants and needs, and it is ritual that creates the orderly conditions for the satisfaction of these. The processes of ritual also create economic activity and stimulate production. There is a cumulative network effect in the overall production and use of goods and services that promotes economic wealth.16

To summarize: Mozi stresses meeting basic desires and needs, frugality of expenditure (especially on the part of the ruler and officials), ensuring population growth, and the maintenance of peace, security and order. In reply, Xunzi shows that the Ru ritual practices do not inhibit these goals. On the contrary, they contribute much more effectively to them. Ritual “nurture” these goals in various ways. It brings order through normative distinctions that curb and moderate desires, ensures adequate supply of goods, and creates more economic wealth overall through its expenditures. In short, ritual nurtures activities and states of affairs that are compatible with the economic goals mentioned by Mozi.

At the same time, however, Xunzi uses “nurture” in ways that suggest the cultivation of other, non-economic dimensions of life. For instance, he speaks of the nurture of life in paradoxical terms—being prepared to go forth to one’s death.
because one is bound by a sense of what honorable. Similarly, when he says that “ritual is nurture,” and talks of nurturing the various senses, he is suggesting that a flourishing life consists in cultivated refinement both brought about by, and engaged through, the rites.

This cultivated refinement is related to another object of nurture. This is the feelings and emotions, 情 qing. Xunzi asks at the end of the paragraph about nurture, “Who knows that the cultured forms of ritual principles are how to nurture the feelings/emotions?” (孰知夫禮義文理之所以養情也) (K19.1d, Li419). This is an important issue that Xunzi will discuss in detail later. For now, let us note that the above discussion of 養 or “nurture” is only a prelude to a wider argument: Mozi’s economic argument is too narrowly focused on the biological dimension of life. To Xunzi, this dimension is equivalent to man’s 性 xing or nature. It is precisely the function of ritual principles to transform this nature.

Mozi’s Convention Argument

As mentioned in the Introduction, Mozi’s criticism that the Ru ritual practices are merely conventional habituations has been less appreciated. I shall call the argument behind this criticism the “convention argument”. At first, this seems to be an extension of the economic argument. However, we shall see that the convention argument is in fact different and more forceful.17
Mozi begins with a statement about what the ruler would do, by analogy with the filial son (孝子). Just as the latter would look after his parents, expand the family pool, and ensure order within the family, the former would enrich the people, increase the population, and ensure order. The ruler is referred to here as the humane or the ren person (仁者), the emphasis being on what the ren person would do. Another concept that Mozi appeals to is yi (義) or what is “right” or “righteous”. He laments that with the passing of the sage kings, yi has been lost and people disagree whether elaborate funerals and lengthy mourning are manifestations of ren, yi and being filial. According to Mozi, the ren person would decide on the basis of whether there is devotion to three things (三務): Actions and practices that can enrich the poor, increase population, bring stability and order to the state would be deemed ren and yi and filial.18

Judging by these criteria, there is no redeeming feature about the Ru funeral rites. There is no economic gain from the elaborate and lavish funeral rites and burials. Those who cannot afford such burials but feel obliged to follow the practice will be impoverished. In the case of the funerals of rulers and ministers, there is great loss of lives in having people to “accompany the dead” (送從, 殺殉). The lengthy three year period of mourning takes its toll on work and production, and “relations between men and women” are disrupted. All these lead to poverty, banditry, decline in
population growth, fewer people to guard and repair fortifications. In short, there will be disorder and inability to defend the state. As a solution, Mozi advocates the following simple burial practice for all, which he claims was prescribed by the sage kings:

“The coffin shall be three inches thick, sufficient to hold the body. As to shrouds there shall be three pieces adequate to cover the corpse. It shall not be buried so deep as to reach water and neither so shallow as to allow the odour to ascend. Three feet in size shall be big enough for the mound. There shall be no extended mourning after burial, but speedy return to work and pursuit in what one can do to procure mutual benefit.”

Why do people maintain elaborate funerals and lengthy mourning when these were not practiced by the sage kings? Mozi’s answer is that they have become accustomed to their practices and regard what is customary as right (便其習而義其俗). He cites the following examples. East of the state of Yue (越) the people of Kai Shu (輆沭) ate the first-born son in the belief that this would be beneficial to the next son. Upon the death of a father, the mother would be abandoned because they could not live “with the wife of a ghost.” South of Chu (楚), the people of Yan (炎) considered it filial to discard the flesh of deceased parents and bury only the bones. West of Qin (秦), the people of Yi Qu (儀渠) cremated their parents’ bodies to enable
their ascension (登遐). Mozi asks: “How can these really be the way of ren and yi (此豈實仁義之道哉)?” On the contrary, their actions are “heartless” (薄).\(^{21}\)

In sum, Mozi’s criticism is that: (1) The Ru practices of burial and mourning are not beneficial. (2) These practices are merely conventional and arbitrary. (3) In both these respects, they are not humane, right, or filial. Note that Mozi is not making a claim about the truth of moral relativism that all burial practices are equally “right”—this would mean that there is no absolute concept of right. Instead, there is a right way to bury one’s parents, which is the utilitarian and speedy way that we have quoted above. This right utilitarian way is considered not only filial, but also humane since it does not have all the bad consequences mentioned.

Note too that Mozi’s criticism is not just that the Ru ritual practices are wasteful. If this were all, it could be met by the response to the economic argument that was described earlier. Instead, there is something deeper in Mozi’s second criticism. Mozi is appealing not just to benefit, but in addition, to moral criteria that are cornerstones of the Ru system of values. To put it succinctly: It so happens that the Ru ritual practices are not beneficial. But the deeper point is that they have no basis in any feelings of being humane, right and filial. Instead, they are merely arbitrary conventions, as shown by the comparison with the other burial practices described.
In this and the subsequent sections, we investigate how Xunzi replies to the convention argument. For the sake of clarity, I have rearranged the points made in a logical and expository sequence instead of following the order of the passages in the *Li Lun Pian*. In this regard, I shall refer to “strategies” of argument adopted by Xunzi.

One strategy is to dissociate the proper Ru ritual practices from the cruel and unnatural practices cited by Mozi. He condemns the cruel practice of sacrificing the living to “accompany the dead” (殺生而送死謂之賊) (K19.8, Li441). And he castigates those who deliberately force an emaciated and starved appearance on themselves. This, he says, is the form of evil men, not the form proper to ritual, and not the *qing* or feeling/emotions of the filial son (是姦人之道, 非禮義之文也, 非孝子之情也). (K19.5b, Li437-38)

Another strategy is to stress the role of feelings in ritual and to accuse Mozi himself of a lack of feeling through his neglect of ritual. Xunzi mentions a few times the “thoughts of longing and remembrance” (思慕之義 K19.4c, Li434; 思慕未忘 K19.9a, Li445; 思慕之情 K19.11, Li450-51). As part of the emphasis on these feelings, Xunzi counter-attacks Mozi. Xunzi first says that there is no conscious creature that would not love its own kind (有知之屬莫不愛其類). In the
context of death, even birds and animals display some form of pining behavior. Man has the highest consciousness and therefore would have the utmost feelings for his own deceased parents. Xunzi then refers to “depraved men who by evening have forgotten a parent who died that morning. And if we indulge in such behavior are we not lower even than these birds and beasts?” (K19.9b-c, Li 445). This is an oblique, *ad hominem* attack on Mozi, who recommends a quick and simple burial.

Thus, Xunzi regains the initiative by reclaiming the ground of feelings for Ru ritual. With the same objective in mind, Xunzi does not want the Ru school to seem unreasonable in failing to concede the need for some flexibility in periods of mourning. He had earlier defended the three-year period by saying that the form was established to accord with the emotions involved (稱情而立文). (K19.9a, Li445) Now he proposes an average of a year for one’s closest kin, the reason being that “Heaven and Earth have completed their changes, the four seasons have come full circle, and everything under the canopy of heaven has begun anew. Thus, the Ancient Kings based themselves on this and used it for their pattern.” (K19.9c, Li 447) Deviation from this, however, is permissible—mourning periods varying from nine months or less to three years for different ranks may be practiced.

All these—the emphasis on proper feeling in ritual, the rejection of cruel practices, and the flexibility in periods of mourning—take the sting away from Mozi’s
criticism that the Ruist ritual practices are not filial, humane, or right. However, Xunzi has yet to say anything more substantial about the principles underlying the rites.

The Three Roots

Early on in the discussion, Xunzi does in fact enunciate a basic principle behind the rites. This comes directly after he mentions the difference between the Mohists and the Ruists—that the Mohists only know about satisfying basic desires of human nature and not the demands of ritual. The ignorance of ritual would lead to failure to satisfy both. (K19.1c, Li419) This suggests a point that will be elaborated further in the later discussion: that ritual fulfills needs belonging to other dimensions of human life. Xunzi then enunciates the following principle:

“Ritual principles have three roots (禮有三本). Heaven and Earth are the root of life (天地者，生之本也). Forebears are the root of kinship (先祖者，類之本也). Lords and teachers are the root of order (君師者，治之本也). Were there no Heaven and no Earth, how could there be life? Were there no forebears, how could there be issue? Were there no lords and no teachers, how could there be order? Were even one of these three lost, there would be no peace and security for man. Thus, rituals serve Heaven above and Earth below, pay honor to one’s forebears, and exalt rulers and teachers, for these are the three roots of ritual
principles.” (K19.2a, Li421)

In the light of Mozi’s convention argument, we may read this as an assertion of the grounding of ritual in certain universal roots. Xunzi argues that the ritual practices of the Ru are not arbitrary, but rooted in the sense of the relations that human beings have with the categories of Heaven and Earth, ancestors, rulers and teachers. Besides having to fulfill basic biological and material needs, humans have a sense of what is significant in life, and this is enacted in rituals that concern the roots mentioned.22

Directly after stating the principle of rootedness, Xunzi discusses the sacrifices of the king to his founding ancestor and Heaven, and at the lower levels the feudal lords, officers, and knights each perform their own sacrifices honoring their own origins (貴始). This practice, according to Xunzi, is the basis of virtue (貴始得[德]之本也). In other words, these sacrificial rituals are an educational process that brings about virtuous feelings. Thus, to have a sense of the roots of life and to pay reverence to them is the basic step toward the development of virtue.

One way to look at the development of virtue is to think of it as an acceptance of the principles of separation and hierarchy. This seems to be suggested by the following passage:

“Through rites, Heaven and Earth are [in accord 以和], the sun and moon shine
brightly, the four seasons observe their natural precedence, the stars and planets move in ranks, the rivers and streams flow, and the myriad things prosper.

Through them, love and hate are tempered, and joy and anger made to fit the occasion (好惡以節，喜怒以當). They are used to make inferiors obedient and to make superiors enlightened. Through a myriad transformations nothing becomes disorderly...Root and branch accord with one another; end and beginning are fitting and proper, one to the other (本末相順，始終相應).”

(K19.2c, Li427)

If we are not to take the above literally to mean that the rites regulate even the natural order, then at least Xunzi is likening the ritual to the natural order. Thus, just as the astronomical bodies and the four seasons revolve in a certain order, ritual imposes an order in human relations through its distinctions and keeping people within the bounds of these distinctions. Despite this “mirroring” of the natural order, however, some qualifications should be made.

First, even if we interpret the making of distinctions as emphasizing a hierarchical order and the sense of one’s place in this order, we should note that this place is not naturally fixed. Instead, there is room for movements across positions based on accomplishment or merit, what Xunzi refers to as ji hou (積厚). (K19.2a, Li422)
Second, as Xunzi constantly reminds us, human beings need to make the effort to establish and to maintain ritual principles. These are the result of constitutive activity (起僞), cumulative effort (積) and deliberation (慮), instead of being something that we are born with. Ritual principles do not occur of their own accord just like natural events.

Third, and following upon the second qualification, some interpretation has to be made of what it means to follow the natural order and to have distinctions in human affairs. The inculcation of a hierarchical order is certainly an important part of ritual distinctions. However, there are other aspects to ritual distinctions. Note the remarks in the quotation above, following those about the natural order. It is said that through the rites, “love and hate are tempered, and joy and anger made to fit the occasion…end and beginning are fitting and proper, one to the other.” These remarks suggest other aspects of ritual distinctions that are equally important, especially when we have in mind the moral transformation brought about by ritual learning and practice.

The Middle Course of Ritual

Thus, the making of ritual distinctions also concerns the achievement of a proper balance between: love and hate (好惡以節), joy and anger (喜怒以當), beginning and end or life and death (終始相應), root and branch (本末相順), emotion and
form (情文俱盡). (K19.2c Li427). Besides nurturing a sense of reverence for the roots of life, a further component of the development of virtue through the rites would be to nurture principles of balance. This is what Xunzi refers to as taking the “middle course” (中流). We describe these principles below.

Consider an example of balance not mentioned in the last paragraph. In the Da Xiang (大饗) sacrifice, the unadorned food and drink served first in the sacrificial feast are said to honor the root of food and drink (貴食飲之本也). However, in the Xiang (饗) and in the Ji (祭) sacrifices, while honoring the root of primitive beginnings with unadorned food, delicacies are also offered. This is referred to as honoring the root while at the same time being practical (貴本而親用). While no further explanation is given about practicality or qin yong (親用) in this context, we can surmise that Xunzi is saying that in ritual, there is a need to strike a balance between bare simplicity and practicality—there may be certain contexts in which bare simplicity may be inappropriate.

Evidently in response to Mozi, most of Xunzi’s discussion concerns the funeral rites. Here too, we see the balancing of “honoring the root” with considerations of practicality. The time allowed for the deceased to be laid in state, for instance, has to be such that those who are far away can return in time to pay their last respects. (K19.4c, Li434) More interesting, however, are the following considerations that
help to maintain a balance between assuaging love of the dead and feeling revulsion at the state of the corpse. Adorning the corpse prevents its hideousness which may tend to inhibit grief (不飾則惡，惡則不衰). However, the ceremony should be such that one gradually comes to be separated from the deceased, and this gradual distancing enables both the proper expressions of grief and reverence on the one hand, and an eventual return to a concern with the living on the other. (K19.5a, Li 436)

Birth and death are referred to as the beginning (始) and the end (終). Beginning and end make the way of man (人道) complete. Thus, it is the way of the gentleman (君子之道) not just to show reverence for the beginning, but equally, for the end. The failure to show reverence for the dead according to the proper ritual forms (禮義之文) shows a rebellious heart (倍判之心) and a lack of earnest sincerity (不忠厚). (K19.4a, Li 432) Accordingly, there are various forms to be observed in the funeral rites, and Xunzi describes the forms proper to the king, the feudal lords and the ordinary person. There is one more category, that of the “castrated criminal”. The description of the burial in this case almost exactly parallels that given by Mozi quoted earlier. Xunzi adds that this burial of the criminal “does not involve uniting his family and neighbors, but brings together only his wife and children…As soon as his body is interred in the earth, everything ends as though there had never been a funeral. Truly this is the ultimate disgrace.” (K19.4b, Li 432)
Emotion and Form

In mentioning the forms of proper burial, Xunzi is reminding his audience of the need for forms of psychological expression, a need that is fulfilled in various ways by the funeral rites.\(^\text{24}\) We have mentioned the balance between the feelings/emotions *qing* (情) and ritual form *wen* (文).\(^\text{25}\) As we have seen, for instance, Xunzi says of those who deliberately look emaciated and starved during the funerals that they are not taking the form proper to ritual, and that these are not the emotions of the filial son. This means that emotion and form are intimately related. Ritual is not, as Mozi claims, merely a convention, but the form in which human emotions are expressed. In the case of the funeral rites, it allows for various psychological expressions of grief. Various relations between emotion and form are possible, each with a different emphasis. However, the perfect state of ritual (至備) is when both emotion and form are fully realized (情文俱盡). (K19.2c, Li427) This proper balance between emotion and form is referred to as taking the middle course of ritual whereby one acts in an integrated manner that combines both inner and outer. (文理情用相為內外表裏，雜行而雜，是禮之中流也). (K19.3, Li430)

What taking the middle course means in practice, however, would depend on the occasion. Thus, there are occasions when grand ritual forms are called for, while on others simpler forms would be appropriate. (故君子上致其隆，下盡其殺，而中處其
Aesthetic considerations are also involved in helping one to strike a proper balance:

“Rites trim what is too long, stretch out what is too short, eliminate excess, remedy deficiency, and extend cultivated forms that express love and respect so that they increase and complete the beauty of conduct according to one’s duty (禮者，斷長續短，損有餘，益不足，達愛敬之文，而滋成行義之美者也).”

Here, we have an interesting reference to the beauty of doing one’s duty or what is right (行義之美). The beauty comes about through the expression of love and reverence according to a proper form. Thus, emotional expression should neither be deficient nor excessive, and what ensures this is a form that is guided by aesthetic criteria. Hence, the elegant adornment (文飾) of ritual:

“…does not go so far as to be sensuous or seductive…Their use of music and happiness does not go so far as to be wayward and abandoned or indolent and rude, nor do weeping and sorrow go so far as to produce despondency or injury to life. Such is the middle course of ritual.” (K19.5b, Li 436-37)

The Significance of Ritual Transformation

We may now discuss the significance of ritual transformation for Xunzi by joining and reiterating some of the points made above. It should be understood that when I refer to “transformation” below, it is the process and the result of transformation
through ritual or ritual principles (禮義) that I am referring to.

As we have seen, Xunzi speaks metaphorically of the wondrous moral force—like the bountiful effects of wind and rain—that the humane person has on others. This metaphor intimates that the effect of transformation is a positive moral state. The transformed person would act on the basis of values like humanity, righteousness and being filial, instead of being constrained by rules.

Xunzi leaves the metaphor behind when he speaks of the effort required to achieve transformation. The object of transformation is the nature that all persons are born with. Its contents are the desire for benefit, sensory desires and dispositions to feelings such as envy and hate. There are tendencies to indulge these, with bad consequences for the individual and the society.

The sage kings therefore devised ritual principles to establish and maintain social order. Together with the influence of teachers and models, these principles impose normative distinctions that curb and moderate people’s desires through a sense of hierarchy and distributional principles of rank, status and merit.

This raises a question about the possibility of the positive moral state that was just mentioned above. If ritual serves to curb and moderate people’s desires through hierarchy and distributional principles, then it seems that all it accomplishes is to make the individual feel bound by normative distinctions.26
I have argued, however, that we should not be too impressed by the fact that Xunzi likens the ritual order to the natural order. Thus, it might be thought that just as the astronomical bodies and the four seasons move and revolve in fixed order, ritual keeps people within the bounds of social and normative distinctions. In this respect, the daily practice of ritual serves to foster and internalize habits and customs that serve the maintenance of order.

Thus, it might appear that under the system of ritual principles that Xunzi describes, there is hardly room for the positive moral state mentioned earlier—it remains a metaphor. In reply to this, it should be admitted that moral education and moral development may begin with the imposition of social and normative distinctions and a sense of hierarchy. It does not follow, however, that the sense of morality thereafter can only be hierarchical. Xunzi stresses that ritual principles are the result of human construction. This being the case, it should not be assumed that the normative distinctions of ritual principles have a naturally set order. And in fact, Xunzi has in mind distinctions that are not just hierarchical ones, bearing in mind the different dimensions and aspects of life.

The crux of Xunzi’s reply to Mozi is that his conception of life is too narrow, since it is confined to the basic desires and needs. In his economic argument, Mozi appeals to the law of economic use which refers to the production and consumption of
basic daily necessities. He also refers to the alleged fact that the sage kings were economical in their use of resources, which means that workers should produce only necessities that would satisfy basic desires and needs. Anything beyond this is deemed not beneficial and “useful”.

To Xunzi, this is to remain at the level of man’s nature and its biological contents. To repeat, it is precisely the object of ritual principles to transform this nature. In this regard, as we have seen, the discussion of “nurture” (養) highlights dimensions of life beside the biological. This is perhaps summed up in the statement that “Ritual is nurture.” This could mean bringing about a better and more refined quality of life. At the same time, however, ritual serves to nurture a sense of trust, authority and peace/security given by the ruler. This need not be confined to the relation between ruler and subjects, however. The sense of trust, authority, peace and security are instilled through various forms of ritual that people tend to take for granted, and without which a society cannot properly function.27

Importantly, there is also the dimension of honor. Xunzi talks paradoxically of the nurture of life through being prepared to die for the sake honor. This example illustrates two remarks of Xunzi’s noted in the beginning of this essay. First, Xunzi remarks that the substantial qualities of a person can be changed (移質). In this example, we have a person who has moved from a biological concern with the
preservation of life to a moral concern with honor through the rites. Second, Xunzi remarks that transformation involves a long-term process with the result of the transformed object or person not reverting to the beginnings. It would be true of the honorable person that he will never revert to the “beginning”, in that he has gone beyond his original nature. But remember that “beginning” and “end” also mean life and death. It would be literally true to say of someone that he will not revert to the beginning if he dies for the sake of honor.

Perhaps the most philosophically interesting dimension of transformation is nurture of the feelings/emotions through a balance with form. This is not just a matter of balance, but integration of emotion and form. The convention argument claims that the Ru ritual practices are just as arbitrary as others. There are two related assumptions behind this argument. One is that the moral values of humanity, righteousness and being filial can have genuine expression independently of the forms of ritual practice. Another is that these values reside in spontaneous feelings that are found in the nature of man. To Xunzi, however, this claim of a separation between man’s nature and convention, or between the feelings and the forms of ritual, is spurious. As he says: “Without nature there would be nothing for constitutive activity to act on, (but) without constitutive activity nature would be unable to beautify itself.”28 (K19.6, Li439). And as Antonio Cua has stated: “When the
natural expression of one’s feeling, such as joy or sadness, love or hate, is subjected to
the regulation and transformation of *li*, it can no longer be viewed as mere natural
expression, for so regulated and transformed it acquires a significance beyond its
original and spontaneous untutored expression.”^29

We may elaborate upon the relation between emotion and form in terms of some
eamples given by Xunzi. Think of the example of those who force an emaciated
and starved appearance on themselves in a funeral rite. Xunzi says that “This is not
the form of ritual and not the emotion of the filial son.” (非禮義之文也，非孝子之
情). This condemnation implies that there is a form or forms that would count as the
proper expression of being filial. Thus, a spontaneous feeling in itself does not
constitute being filial. Instead, certain forms of action would count as being filial or
ot. Take the speedy burial advocated by Mozi, for instance. We had said that
Xunzi’s oblique reference to this constitutes an *ad hominem* argument against Mozi.
But putting this in the context of the relation between emotion and form, let us
imagine someone following Mozi’s general recommendation of speedy burial. It
may well be that this person’s action is not filial because it gives the impression that
he has quickly forgotten his parent, implying that he has not cared. Of course,
pretense is possible while going through the motions of ritual. But this does not
invalidate the integration of emotion and form. On the contrary, pretense is possible
because of this integration in the first place.

We may also consider the following examples in the *Xing E Pian* (“Nature is Bad”) which follows the statement supposedly made by the sage-king Shun, that man’s emotions are unlovely (*人情甚不美*). A man who has married and built up his own family may neglect his filial duty to his parents; someone who has received what he desired may betray the relation of trust with a friend; and someone may abandon loyalty to a superior after having attained a high and lucrative official post. The feelings of being filial, loyal and trustworthy cannot be understood apart from what it means to be in the particular relationship in each case. In the case of the superior-inferior relationship, for instance, perhaps the inferior no longer pays his respects. Or perhaps not quite realizing it himself, he becomes neglectful in some way, thus indicating that he no longer values the relationship. In either case, he fails to manifest loyalty. What this shows is that the feeling of loyalty is structured by certain forms, and failure to maintain these forms—in the absence of some good explanation—constitutes not being loyal. Again, it is possible for someone to hide his real feelings while maintaining the form. But it is the context of events that reveals this, and the possibility of pretense does nothing to negate the integration of emotion and form.

Maintenance of the form and whether it expresses the appropriate emotion,
however, is a complex matter. Getting it right involves a host of factors. One has
to balance simplicity, for instance, with a sense of the occasion and the need to be
practical. Neither form nor emotion should be exaggerated. Wisdom is required to
realize, for instance, that sometimes there is a need to maintain distance so as to
perform one’s duty properly. Thus, different occasions call for different
combinations of emotion and form. In other words, taking the “middle course” is
not a fifty-fifty matter. Aesthetic considerations may be involved since the making
of distinctions in keeping a balance is a refined matter.

This elaboration of the balance between emotion and form enables us to see that
what constitutes actions that are humane (ren), right (yì), or filial (xiāo) is not
something self-evident, or simply based on some feeling independent of conventional
forms. As Xunzi notes, you cannot have one without the other. Even so, a proper
balance has to be negotiated and it is the cultivation and refinement of ritual learning
that helps one to do this successfully.

Conclusion

In his reply to Mozi’s criticism, Xunzi has to concede the excesses of some Ru ritual
practices. Although he sometimes resorts to (what seems to be) *ad hominem*
argument in reclaiming the ground of feeling for ritual principles, Xunzi manages to
offer a more substantial reply to Mozi’s convention argument. Essentially, this is
that there are non-biological dimensions of life that require to be nurtured. In particular, the emotions require to be nurtured as they cannot be totally divorced from the conventional forms of ritual through which they are expressed. These forms serve not merely to transform the person to habitually obey rules of hierarchy. Instead, through them, he has learned to be humane, to do what is right and to be filial according to a balanced integration of emotion and form. In these respects, he has gone permanently beyond the biological dimension that constitutes his nature. As Xunzi says, he has been nurtured by ritual (li zhe yang ye 禮者養也).

Endnotes

1. References to the *Xunzi* 荀子 will be of the following texts: (1) John Knoblock, *Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works*, Vols.1-3 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988, 1990, 1994). (2) Li Disheng 李滌生, 荀子集釋 (台北: 學生書局, 1994 edition). These will be abbreviated respectively as “K” followed by passage number, and “L” followed by page number. I have benefited from Knoblock’s translations but will not follow them exactly, sometimes modifying and sometimes providing my own. His passage numberings provide a convenient and helpful reference tool.

2. The same metaphor of the wondrous effect of wind and seasonal rain in the context of moral force can be found in the *Mencius* 孟子. See D.C. Lau, tr.,
Mencius (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1984), bilingual edition. In 3A2, Mencius quotes Confucius: “The virtue of the gentleman is like the wind; the virtue of the small man is like grass. Let the wind blow over the grass, and it is sure to bend.” (君子之德, 風也; 小人之德, 草也。草尚之風, 必偃). In 7A13 we find words that are similar to Xunzi’s in K15.2: “A gentleman transforms where he passes, and works wonders where he abides.” (夫君子所過者化, 所存者神). In 7A40 Mencius states that the first way in which a gentleman teaches (教) is “by a transforming influence like that of timely rain.” (如時雨化之者). Scott Cook, “Xun Zi on Ritual and Music,” Monumenta Serica 45 (1997), p.28, note 66, citing the Maoshi zhengyi [Sibu beiyao ed.], p.12 [juan 1.1, p.3a], notes the line in the “Da xu” 大序 of the Shijing 詩經: “’Feng’ means the wind; it means teaching. With the wind, [things or people] are moved; with teaching, [things or people] are transformed (hua).” (風，風也，教也。風以動之，教以化之). Note that in contemporary Chinese, we have the idiom “Spring wind transforms (into) rain” (春風化雨) which refers to the influence of a good teacher.

3. The two statements of Xunzi just cited might seem to contradict another passage from the Zheng Ming Pian (正名篇 “On the Correct Use of Names”): 狀變而實無別而為異者，謂之化。有化而無別，謂之一實. (Li516) Antonio Cua, in correspondence, has suggested a translation, which I have modified: “The
form/appearance changes but the substantive entity (shi 實) remains the same (wu bie 無別), even though it may seem to be different—this is called transformation hua 化. There is transformation but (something) remains the same—this is called one substantive entity.” (Compare K22.2h) Cua suggests that if we read xing 性 as shi 實, hua xing 化性 is the 性 transformed. Thus, the object of hua is (in many contexts) xing. Xunzi uses the analogy of a potter’s molding clay into a vessel, and so on; and xing provides materials for the beautification of xing. Thus, Cua understands “transformation” as giving shape or form to original and given materials in nature. This, according to Cua, seems consistent with Xunzi’s definition of hua in the above passage. In view of Cua’s remarks, I would say that there should be no contradiction as well with the two statements of Xunzi’s that I have just cited in the discussion. That is, it is possible for nature to be transformed such that it will not return to what it was before—like the wheel not returning to its former quality of being straight. In this sense, it has become different. But at the same time, the substantive entity—say, the basic material of wood—remains the same. If we apply this to the transformation of human nature, it would amount to saying that the material nature (say of basic desires and feelings) remains. Hopefully, our later discussion of the integration between emotion and form will help to make some sense of this. Cua himself relies on the distinction between second-order desires and first-order desires.


6. In the beginning of this essay, we referred to analogies of transformation. Some of these such as the shaping of wood and the sharpening of metal are repeated in the Xing E Pian 性惡篇 (“Nature is Bad”) (K23.1b, Li540). In addition, there is the analogy of shaping clay to make a vessel (K23.2a, Li544). The contexts of these analogies are the roles of learning and of ritual principles in transforming the nature of man (化性 K23.2a, Li545). Quite clearly, the transformation is said to be effected
through the form and principles of ritual (化禮義之文理 K23.2a, Li545) and through the guiding influence of teachers and models (化師法 K23.1b, Li540).


8. Mei, p.241; Sun, p.149.

9. This indicates that the Mohists did practice some minimal forms of ritual.

10. Mei, p.235; Sun, p.145.

11. Mei, p.235; Sun, p.145.

12. Mei, p.240; Sun, p.149 (不極五味之調, 芬香之和).

13. Mei, p.242; Sun, p.151 (俯仰周旋威儀之禮, 聖王弗為). Scott Cook, “Xun Zi on Ritual and Music,” Monumenta Serica 45 (1997), gives a very good account of the apparent extravagances of ritual that Mozi was critical of. See for instance the account of the costs in material and manpower involved in the grand musical performances during Mozi’s time on p.11.

14. Antonio Cua reads 養人之欲 as suggesting “refinement of desires, which involves reflection and insight in moral learning.” He cites as support the distinction
made by Liang Qixiong 梁啓雄 “between tianxing zhi yu 天性欲 (desires as endowed by nature or natural desires) and lixing yu 理性欲 (desires guided by reason or reflective desires).” See Cua, “The Virtues of Junzi,” note 54, paper read at the “International Conference on Confucianism: Retrospect and Prospect”, University of Toronto, Canada, September 1-2, 2005. See also, Cua, “Dimensions of Li (Propriety),” in Human Nature, Ritual, and History. See 梁啓雄, Xunzi Jianshi (荀子簡釋 (台北: 商務, 1978), p.323. Both Cua and Liang are referring to the passage in the Zhengming Pian 正名篇 (“On the Correct Use of Names”) which reads: 所受乎天之一欲，制於所受乎心之多，固難類所受乎天也. (Li527) Cua translates: “A single desire which one receives from nature (tian) is regulated and directed by the mind in many different ways, and thus it is difficult to assign it to the same class as those which we receive from nature (tian 天).”

15. Burton Watson, tr., Hsün Tzu Basic Writings (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p.90, translates the sentence as “[As for the king’s officials] let them understand clearly that to advance in the face of death and to value honor is the way to satisfy their desire for life;” while Knoblock has it as “Who understands that risking death in carrying out a commission is how an officer cares for his life?” I follow Watson and also Li Disheng, who understands 要節 in the sense of 立名節 which is equivalent to establishing or maintaining honor. See Li, p.420, note 8.
16. Scott Cook, “Xun Zi on Ritual and Music,” *Monumenta Serica* 45 (1997), pp.14-15, offers a slightly different but not incompatible explanation, that for Xunzi “ritual divisions promotes the structured and restrained use of limited economic resources, without which economic deprivation cannot but ensue. He addresses a Mohist concern, and criticizes the Mohists for their failure to see it through. His main argument, here and elsewhere, seems to be that the cost of the sometimes lavish ritual expenditures that Ruism entails more than pays for itself in the long term by virtue of its effect upon the continuing stability of society and the plenitude of its resources.” In other words, ritual provides the conditions of stability that enables the restrained use of resources, instead of the creation of more wealth.

17. See Chapter 25 of the *Mozi*, “Simplicity in Funeral” (III) 節葬下, with reference to both Yi-pao Mei’s bilingual edition and Sun Yirang as cited above.

18. Mei, p.246; Sun, p.154.

19. Mei, pp.250-256; Sun, pp.156-163.

20. Mei, p.260; Sun, pp.164-165.

21. Mei, pp.264-266; Sun, pp.170-172. Note the striking similarity of the examples to that given by the ancient Greek historian Herodotus (5th century B.C.), as recounted by James Rachels, *The Elements of Moral Philosophy* (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2003), p.16. Darius, a king of ancient Persia was impressed by the variety of cultural
practices. For instance, the Callatians (a tribe of Indians) customarily ate the bodies of their dead fathers, while the Greeks regarded cremation as natural. He asked the Greeks and Callatians at his court, respectively, what they would take (as a reward) to adopt the other’s practice. Both parties were equally horrified by the suggestions. This example is cited by Michel de Montaigne, “On Habit: and on never easily changing a traditional law,” in M.A. Screech, tr., The Essays of Michel de Montaigne (Harmondsworth: The Penguin Press, 1991), pp.130-131. I thank Cecilia Wee for this reference.

22. It is not difficult to accept the idea that one is rooted to ancestors and family. Without these roots—the identity and places that they give us, the relations engendered, the nurturance and education received, and so on—there would be no life to speak of and no order to life. The sense of rootedness brings with it feelings of reverence and ritual is the form by which these feelings are expressed. On the other hand, it may or may not be difficult for people in contemporary times to accept Xunzi’s assertion of man’s being rooted in and having a reverence for Heaven and Earth. This may be a religious belief that some would not find it difficult to relate to, according to their own belief system.

23. According to Li Disheng, The term ben 本 (root) refers to the emotions 情, while mo 末 (branch) refers to the cultural form wen 文. See Li, p.428, note 6.
24. For an interesting account of some of these forms in the contemporary context of the Chinese in Hong Kong, see Peter Cheung, Cecilia Chan, Wai Fu, Yawen Li, and Grace Cheung, “‘Letting Go’ and ‘Holding On’: Grieving and Traditional Death Rituals in Hong Kong,” in Cecilia Chan and Amy Chow, eds., Death, Dying and Bereavement—A Hong Kong Chinese Experience (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2006).

25. Antonio Cua, “Dimensions of Li (Propriety)” in Human Nature, Ritual and History, discusses the balance between emotion and form, the beautification of original nature and character, the emotional quality involved in ritual performance, and so on. See especially pages 49-57 which is devoted to the aesthetic dimension of ritual. 陳昭瑛 (Zhao-ying Chen), 儒家美學與經典詮釋 (台北: 台灣大學出版社中心, 2005), Chapter 3, [情] 概念從孔孟到荀子的轉化, lists the various meanings of 情 in the Xunzi, including those which include a contrast and balance between 情 and 文 or emotion and form.

26. Scott Cook, “Xun Zi on Ritual and Music,” Monumenta Serica 45 (1997), contrasts the functions of ritual and music. Ritual serves to maintain hierarchical distinctions that are internalized and seen as “virtually inescapable natural laws.” (p.16). Music, on the other hand, serves to harmonize. But as Cook describes it, music is an instrument of the ruler to “harness human sentiments and carry great
masses of people forward in even uniformity to an obedient and willing submission to the ruler’s will.” (p.23). Even though Cook qualifies this to say that the ruler is exerting moral influence in transforming the people, there still seems to be a strong hierarchical element in this description. My account of ritual differs from Cook’s in that I hold ritual to have more than the function of inculcating a sense of hierarchy.

27. See John Kekes, “Pluralism and Moral Authority,” in Kim-chong Chong, Sor-hoon Tan, and C.L. Ten, eds., The Moral Circle and the Self (Chicago: Open Court, 2003), for an account of the various kinds of authority and their legitimate roles in our lives.

28. In the light of Mozi’s convention argument and Xunzi’s response in terms of the relation between emotion and form, perhaps the paragraph in which this passage occurs (19.6) should no longer be considered as not properly belonging to the Lilun Pian. On the contrary, the paragraph (or at least the passage cited) seems crucial to the chapter/book. Knoblock, for instance, says “It is apparent…that it is unconnected with the content of this Book and rather belongs to Book 23 [Xing E Pian “Nature is Bad”].” See Knoblock, Vol.III, p.322, note 96. Burton Watson, tr., Hsün Tzu Basic Writings (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), says “This paragraph seems to have little to do with what goes before or after and almost certainly does not belong here. In wording and thought it is most closely allied to
sec.23, ‘Man’s Nature is Evil.’ Probably five or six of the bamboo slips upon which the text of that section was originally written dropped out and were mistakenly inserted here.” See Watson, p.102, note 16. Influenced by these views, I noted in an earlier paper that “This passage can neatly take its place just prior to 23.1e.” See Kim-chong Chong, “Xunzi’s Systematic Critique of Mencius, Philosophy East and West 53:2 (2003), p.222. But even though the passage in question (故曰：性者，本始材朴也；偽者，文理隆盛也。無性則偽之無所加，無偽者性不能自美) may fit in nicely before 23.1e, I am no longer sure that it does not belong to the Lilun Pian at all.

In fact, there is another similar passage that occurs in the Ru Xiao Pian (儒效篇, “Teachings of the Ru”): “Nature is insufficient by itself to establish order. Nature is what I cannot bring about. However, it can be transformed.” (性不足以獨立而治. 性也者，吾所不能為也，然而可化也). (K8.11, Li154).